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A Moral/Contractual Approach to
Labor Law Reform
Zev J. Eigen* and David Sherwyn**
When laws cease to operate as intended, legislators and scholars tend to propose new
laws to replace or amend them. This Article posits an alternative: offering regulated
parties the opportunity to contractually bind themselves to behave ethically. The perfect
test case for this proposal is labor law, because (1) labor law has not been amended for
decades, (2) proposals to amend it have failed for political reasons and are focused on
union election win rates and less on the election process itself, (3) it is an area of law
already statutorily regulating parties’ reciprocal contractual obligations, and (4) moral
means of self-regulation derived from contract are more likely to be effective when
parties have ongoing relationships like those between management and labor
organizations. The Article explains how the current law and proposed amendments fail
because they focus on fairness as a function of union win rates, and then outlines a plan
to leverage strong moral contractual obligations and related norms of behavior to
create as fair a process as possible for employees to vote unions up or down.
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Introduction
A formidable body of literature and a growing set of empirical
research confirm that people obey the law for a host of reasons
independent from a positivist rationale of obeying for the sake of
1
2
3
obeying. Rationales offered include instrumental, social/relational, and

1. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (2006); Kent Greenawalt, The Natural
Duty to Obey the Law, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1985); see also Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, The
Common Place of Law (1998).
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1349,
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4

moral. Recent research on contractual obedience suggests that morally
framing an obligation to perform as contractually obligated yields greater
likelihood and magnitude of performing an undesirable task as compared
to framing the request to obey the same contract in terms of a legal
5
threat. While extralegal effects like this are well recognized and, in some
instances, may be more powerful than law by itself as a means of affecting
6
behavior, to the Authors’ knowledge, they are not incorporated into plans
for legal reform. That is, if tort law is broken, legislators and scholars
most often suggest revising tort laws, not crafting nonlegal incentive
structures like relational, social, or moral constraints that operate
independently from the law or in conjunction therewith. We suggest
doing just that as a means of reforming labor law. Specifically, we
7
propose incorporating a set of moral principles embodied in a contract to
which union and management would both be incentivized to agree,
which would make the process of certifying unions as agents of collective
bargaining significantly fair and would result in a less costly
administrative system.
Labor law is the perfect test case for such a proposal. Labor law
involves state regulation of a tripartite relationship among labor

1349–61 (2009) (presenting an instrumental view of contracts); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated
Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 633, 635 (2010)
(describing the economic prediction of human behavior as one in which an individual will breach a
contract if breaching yields an extra dollar earned); see also Simeon Djankov et al., Courts, 118 Q.J.
Econ. 453, 454–57 (2003) (examining the cost of evicting tenants as a function of whether a judicial
system is based on civil law or common law).
3. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1473–74 (1998) (using sociological and social-psychological
literature to explain behavioral economics in law); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 61–62 (1963) (finding that parties in the automobile
industry rely more heavily and often on relational grounds for enforcing contracts than on legal sanctions
contained therein). See generally Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective
on Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 323 (1997).
4. See generally Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Form-Adhesive Contracts:
Experimental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise and Performance, 41 J. Legal Stud.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640245; Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman,
Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 Geo. L.J. 5 (2011); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan &
Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. Empirical Legal
Stud. 405 (2009).
5. Eigen, supra note 4 (manuscript at 23).
6. Id.
7. We use the term “moral” throughout this Article loosely. As noted by others, there is lack of
convergence among scholars on what is meant by “morals,” “ethics,” or “values” broadly. See, e.g.,
Steven Hitlin & Jane Allyn Piliavin, Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept, 30 Ann. Rev. Soc. 359, 360
(2004). For the purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to distinguish among the various
conceptualizations and operationalizations of the term. We mean simply to refer to the set of
constraints on behavior derivative from one’s sense of obligation based on communal norms of
acceptable behavior; ideals about desirable characteristics, states, or actions; or evaluative beliefs on
how to orient ourselves in contemporary life. Short of picking an unnecessary etymological fight for
which the Authors are woefully unprepared, we use this term as a synthetic catch-all of definitions.
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organizations, employers, and employees. The interrelationship among
these actors may be legally constrained, but ultimately, most of the
means of enforcement already lie in nonlegal, quasi-legal, and informal
8
mechanisms, perhaps more so than in many other areas of law. By
comparison, a dispute about how much federal income tax one owes will
be resolved directly between the state and the individual, with the tax
code as the legal standard indisputably relied upon by all. Unions and
employers routinely rely heavily on their ongoing relationships to resolve
legally valenced disputes (like employment discrimination) informally,
leveraging the power of the parties’ ongoing relationship to fashion
9
remedies all can accept. Labor law, therefore, has a built-in, preexisting
basis for nonlegal compliance that heavily leverages the parties’
collective set of norms of behavior, reciprocity, morality, fairness, and
justice. Additionally, labor law is ultimately a means of facilitating
parties’ self-regulation via contract. Contract is deeply rooted in morality,
social constraints, and norms of fairness and reciprocity, such that
proposing extralegal ways of self-policing them may be more effective
than purely legal means. These two factors make labor law an ideal space
in which to test the Authors’ extralegal reform hypotheses.
Before suggesting this reform, it is necessary to explain why such
(perhaps) seemingly drastic reform is necessary. To do so, this Article
asks two questions: Are the rights to be represented by a union and to
collectively bargain with employers over wages, hours, and terms and
conditions of employment worth saving, and, if they are, what is the best
way to go about saving them? Considering the shocking lack of change to
labor law since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act
10
(“NLRA”) in 1935 relative to the steadfast and voluminous changes to
11
other laws regulating the workplace passed since that time, labor law
12
reform is considered by many to be long overdue. However, labor law
reform has been a failed promise under the previous two Democratic
administrations, and likely will be under the current one as well.

8. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1527,
1532 (2002); Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions
on Collective Action, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133, 181 (1996).
9. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 373,
418 (1990).
10. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2010)).
11. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575,
584–93 (1992).
12. See, e.g., William B. Gould IV, Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment
Relationships and the Law 9 (1993); Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law
Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 827, 828 (1996);
Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality
Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 369, 374 n.8 (2001);
Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 97, 97 (1993).

Eigen & SHERWYN_21 (F. VALDEZ) (Do Not Delete)

March 2012]

3/26/2012 5:22 PM

MORAL/CONTRACTUAL LABOR LAW REFORM

699

President Carter proposed sweeping reform, including shortening the
time for union elections, standardizing the rules for defining bargaining
units, and increasing the penalties against employers who violate the
13
14
law. Carter’s proposed reform lost on the Senate floor. President
Clinton proposed prohibiting employers from permanently replacing
15
striking employees. This proposed reform ended with the midterm
16
elections of 1994. President Obama announced plans for the most
aggressive labor law reform of the three presidents: the Employee Free
17
Choice Act (“EFCA”). Under EFCA, an employer would have to
recognize a union as the exclusive agent of the employees for collective
bargaining over terms and conditions of employment if the union

13. Labor Reform Act of 1977, S. 1883, 95th Congress (1977). The following is an excerpt from a
July 18, 1977, speech President Carter made to Congress:
An election on union representation should be held within a fixed, brief period of time after
a request for an election is filed with the Board. This period should be as short as is
administratively feasible. The Board, however, should be allowed some additional time to
deal with complex cases.
The Board should be instructed to establish clear rules defining appropriate bargaining
units. This change would not only help to streamline the time-consuming, case-by-case
procedures now in effect, but would also allow labor and management to rely more fully on
individual Board decisions.
....
When employers are found to have refused to bargain for a first contract, the Board should
be able to order them to compensate workers for the wages that were lost during the period
of unfair delay. . . .
The Board should be authorized to award double back-pay without mitigation to workers
who were illegally discharged before the initial contract. This flat-rate formula would
simplify the present time-consuming back-pay process and would more fully compensate
employees for the real cost of a lost job.
The Board should be authorized to prohibit a firm from obtaining Federal contracts for a
period of three years, if the firm is found to have willfully and repeatedly violated NLRB
orders. Such a debarment should be limited to cases of serious violations and should not
affect existing contracts. . . .
. . . . The Board should also be required to seek preliminary injunctions against certain
unfair labor practices which interfere seriously with employee rights, such as unlawful
discharges.
James Earl Carter, President of the U.S., Labor Law Reform Message to the Congress Transmitting
Proposed Legislation (July 18, 1977), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7821.
14. On June 22, 1978, Senate Bill 1883 (renumbered S. 2467), was recommitted to the Senate
Human Resources Committee and did not reemerge. 124 Cong. Rec. 18,393–400 (1978).
15. Cesar Chavez Workplace Fairness Act, H.R. 5, 103d Cong. (1993). The bill was passed in the
House of Representatives but died in the Senate.
16. In a last-ditch effort to effectuate some form of labor reform, President Clinton instituted an
Executive Order prohibiting government contracts with employers who permanently replaced striking
workers. Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (Mar. 8, 1995). The Executive Order was
overturned by the D.C. Circuit on the grounds that it was preempted by the NLRA, which guarantees
employers the right to replace striking workers. Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Reich, 74 F.3d
1322, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
17. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong.
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presented the employer with “authorization cards” signed by employees
18
stating that they want the union to represent them. Essentially, this
authorization-card method for obtaining recognition would supplant the
secret-ballot election whereby unions petition the National Labor
19
Relations Board (“NLRB”) asking that the unit of employees they seek
to represent vote for or against the union some thirty or more days
following the petition, typically after both the employer and the union
20
campaign for their votes. Under EFCA, the penalties for violations of
21
the NLRA and related statutes would triple, and parties that did not
reach a first contract within 120 days would be forced to submit their
22
proposals to interest arbitration. Like with President Clinton, the
midterm elections of President Obama’s first term have, for all intents
and purposes, terminated the possibility of legislative labor law reform,
23
especially as sweeping as EFCA promised to be. Labor law reform
under President Obama, however, is not dead. Instead, the Obama
24
administration’s NLRB has the power and, seemingly, the desire, to
promulgate rules and hand down decisions that could satisfy organized
labor’s most pressing goal: increasing union membership by making it
easier to organize.
It is understandable why labor seeks to increase union density in the
U.S. At its height in the mid-1950s, organized labor represented about
25
35% of the U.S. workforce. That percentage has declined steadily since
26
that time, to 11.9%. In the private sector today, only 6.9% of the

18. Id. § 2.
19. The NLRB was established by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 153
(2010). The NLRB is made up of five members appointed by the President for staggered five-year
terms. Id. § 153(a).
20. S. 560 § 2(a).
21. Id. § 4(b)(1).
22. Id. § 3. Interest arbitration, traditionally used in the public sector, would result in an
arbitrator deciding the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment for private-sector
employees and employers.
23. The Democrats lost their majority in the House in 2010 and now are not close to the sixty
votes needed in the Senate.
24. Traditionally, the NLRB consists of three members of the President’s party and two members
of the party not in power. William B. Gould IV, Labored Relations: Law, Politics, and the
NLRB—A Memoir 54 (2000). When President Bush left office, the NLRB had only two members.
Currently, there are four members, three of whom are Democrats. See Board Members Since 1935,
NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board/board-members-1935 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
25. Paul Osterman et al., Working in America: A Blueprint for the New Labor Market 46
(2001).
26. Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and
Employment Among All Wage and Salary Workers, 1973–2010, Unionstats.com,
http://www.unionstats.com (follow “html” hyperlink located below “All Wage & Salary Workers”)
(last visited Feb. 14, 2012); see also News Release, Union Members—2011, Bureau Lab. Stat. (Jan. 27,
2012), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (reporting an 11.8% union membership rate in
the U.S. in 2011).
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27

workforce is unionized —the approximate level just before the New
28
Deal. What is unclear is whether labor law reform aimed at increasing
union density is good for the U.S. economy, good for employees, good
for employers and their customers, and whether employees ultimately
want to unionize. Union leaders often answer these questions swiftly and
definitively. According to organized labor, unionization benefits
employees, customers, and the U.S. economy, and therefore should be
29
encouraged whether employers like it or not. With regard to employee
choice, organized labor contends that nearly all employees want to be
unionized (or at least would want to be organized once the benefits of
unionization are explained), and only reject unions in secret-ballot
elections because the organizing system unfairly favors employers by
allowing companies to get away with coercing and intimidating
30
employees. Underlying these claims are some assumptions about the
continued need for and utility of unionism in contemporary workplaces
in the U.S. This Article evaluates these critical assumptions, addresses
the most recent labor law reform attempt embodied in EFCA, and
explains how an alternative reform approach endorsed by the Authors
relies less on normative assumptions about whether unions should regain
their dominance or should be allowed to continue to wither, and more on
an essential underlying feature of modern liberal democratic theory: the
right to freely elect one’s representatives or to remain free from
representation. The proposed reform also departs from pure reliance on
legal amendments, shifting to reliance on unions’ and employers’ joint
and symbiotic reciprocity and collective moral obligation as a means of
leveraging enforcement that theoretically could result in a greater
likelihood of election results that closer accord the ultimate preferences
of employees and in lower administrative costs of enforcement.

27. Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 26 (follow “html” hyperlink located below “Private
Sector”).
28. Osterman, supra note 25, at 46.
29. See, e.g., Unions Are Good for Business, Productivity and the Economy, AFL-CIO,
http://www.aflcio.org/joinaunion/why/uniondifference/uniondiff8.cfm (last visited Feb. 14, 2012); see
also Harley Shaiken, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The High Road to a Competitive Economy: A Labor
Law Strategy (2004) (arguing that unionization benefits the economy and productivity, and
advocating for card-check authorization against elections).
30. See, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and
Federal Labor Law, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 495, 546–600 (1993) (advocating against employer free speech in
union elections and arguing that the existing process is wildly biased in favor of employers); Rafael
Gomez & Morley Gunderson, The Experience Good Model of Trade Union Membership, in The
Changing Role of Unions: New Forms of Representation 92, 108 (Phanindra V. Wunnava ed.,
2004) (concluding that the benefits of unions are opaque to nonunion members); Interactive Map:
Unions Are Good for Workers and the Economy in Every State, Ctr. for Am. Progress Action Fund
(Feb. 15, 2009), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/02/unions_workers.html [hereinafter
Union Map].
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Part I reviews research on the effects of unionization on employees
and employers to address the question of whether a primary goal of
national policy should be to abolish unions, champion their resurrection,
or perpetuate the status quo. We conclude that existing scholarship does
not support either abolishing or championing unionization, but that the
status quo deserves to be revisited because the focus of advocates for
reforming the current system is on win rates, and not sufficiently on
employee choice. Part II then sets out a fair system maximizing employee
free choice to unionize or not. Fairness ought not be defined exclusively
by results, as in a distributive-justice-focused approach in which a high
union win rate equals a fair system and a low union win rate equals an
unfair system. Instead, we posit that a fair system is one that maximizes
employees’ opportunities to make fully informed choices free of coercion
or intimidation—embodying a procedural-justice focused approach. Part
III analyzes the current systems in use and being proposed and finds that
neither the status quo nor proposals by legislators or the NLRB satisfy
our conceptualization of procedural-justice focused fairness. Part IV
outlines a system that does satisfy our standard of fairness by capitalizing
on extralegal behavioral norms derived in part from the long-standing
moral principle of “living up to one’s word.” This would result in a
system with greater self-regulation by the parties, lower administrative
costs, and greater opportunity for employees to exercise their rights to
vote for their representatives or to vote not to be represented in the
workplace based on more complete information, free from coercion and
intimidation. We conclude by discussing the implications of adopting the
proposal advanced, and opportunities for extending it to other areas of
law.

I. Are Employees and Employers Better or Worse Off
When Organized?
Unions may be assessed by how they impact the U.S. economy,
employees, employers, and customers or recipients of the goods and
services provided by organized workplaces. The ultimate question of
whether the U.S. economy is better off with greater union density is
complex and beyond the scope of this Article. Organized labor,
industrial-relations theorists, and some academics, however, believe that
unions are a net positive for the economy and that greater union density
31
correlates linearly with improved economic prosperity. According to
31. See generally Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Commons and the Wisconsin School on Industrial
Relations Strategy and Policy, 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3, 5–7 (2003) (discussing the early views of
John R. Commons, a prominent institutionalist in the industrial-relations scholarship tradition, who
came to believe that trade unions could improve the conditions of laboring people by using the “device
of the common rule” and collective bargaining to “stabilize labor markets and equalize bargaining
power, while also using methods of collective voice to replace industrial autocracy with industrial
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organized labor, unions consistently provide higher wages and greater
32
job security. This in turn “primes the consumption pump” and increases
33
demand for goods and services. Increased demand requires employers
to increase supplies of goods and services, which creates jobs (and
34
therefore decreases unemployment) and increases GDP. To support
this contention, labor points to the 1950s as a time of unprecedented and
subsequently unmatched growth in unionization, union density, parity
between rich and poor, and economic prosperity. This argument has
appeal, but may be too simplistic. In the 1950s there was no real threat of
foreign competition to U.S. employers, particularly those in heavily
35
unionized workplaces. Europe and Japan were slowly recovering from
the devastation of World War II, and the rest of today’s current and
rising powers were still developing. Moreover, 1950s transportation and
36
information systems obviously impeded foreign competition. Finally,
the U.S. had seemingly unlimited natural resources. Thus, while it makes
sense to credit unions with increasing wages, reducing the gap between
rich and poor, and increasing consumers’ purchasing power, one could
argue that high costs of unionization forced U.S. manufacturers to
produce their goods outside of the U.S. and, thus, instead of being a
solution to America’s economic woes, unionization was the cause. The
positive union effect might have been short-term and conditional on
historical context. Regardless of whether unionization is a reason for
some of America’s trade and economic woes, it seems naïve to argue that
the solution to America’s struggles in this global economy, where the
U.S. has exported the vast majority of its manufacturing to reduce costs,
is to increase wages through unionization. On the other hand, the
argument that the gap between rich and poor depletes the middle class
and reduces GDP because capital remains with the wealthy instead of
being dispersed to those who will put the money back into the economy
is very appealing.
There is ample academic literature devoted to whether employees
are better off when unionized. The general conclusion is that employees
37
are better compensated but less satisfied. An early empirical
examination of the impacts of unionization in the workplace begins with

democracy”).
32. See David Madland & Karla Walter, Unions Are Good for the American Economy, Ctr. for
Am. Progress Action Fund (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/02/
efca_factsheets.html; see also Union Map, supra note 30.
33. See Madland & Walter, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Causes of Increased Competition in the U.S. Economy, 1939–
1980, 64 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 613, 620–22 & tbl.4 (1982).
36. Michael E. Porter, Competition in Global Industries: A Conceptual Framework, in
Competition in Global Industries 15, 42–45 (Michael E. Porter ed., 1986).
37. Richard B. Freeman & James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 20–21 (1984).
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the observation that “unions alter nearly every . . . measurable aspect of
38
the operation of workplaces.” This study has been credited as the first
to stimulate scholarly interest in how unions affect factors beyond wages,
including satisfaction, productivity, business profitability, investment,
39
and the economy. Labor-relations scholars have since endeavored to
uncover unionism’s effects on these various aspects.
40
While unionization results in an increase in wages, it does not come
with a concomitant increase in productivity, and therefore the increased
41
salary expense reduces employer profit. For example, a 2004 study of
thirteen years of operating, financial, and employment data for major
airlines found union-imposed wage increases correlated with decreased
employee productivity, decreased airplane productivity, and overall
42
decreased operating margins. Interestingly, the study found that the
43
“quality of labor relations” was a significant control variable. Sandra
44
Black and Lisa Lynch confirm this dimension. In their analysis of a
national survey of businesses, they found that firms with traditional
labor-management relations had significantly lower productivity than did
45
nonunion firms. However, when controlling for the presence of certain
employee-empowering practices (for example, total quality management
and profit sharing), the impact of unionization on productivity dwindled
46
to statistical insignificance. Similarly, Harry Holzer analyzed a 1982

38. Id. at 19.
39. See James T. Bennett & Bruce E. Kaufman, What Do Unions Do?: A Twenty-Year
Perspective, 25 J. Lab. Res. 339, 339 (2004); Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions Do for Economic
Performance?, 25 J. Lab. Res. 415, 415 (2004).
40. That unionization increases wages is generally accepted among scholars. See Freeman &
Medoff, supra note 37, at 20 (finding that unionization results in increased wages and fringe benefits);
David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would
Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, 25 J. Lab. Res. 383, 406–07 (2004) (finding that unionization does
not increase wages as much as it did in the 1970s but that the wage premium is substantial).
41. See John T. Addison & Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth:
Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. Lab. Econ. 72, 92 (1989) (reviewing several studies and concluding
that, on average, unionization is associated with decreased productivity); Hirsch, supra note 39, at 430–
31 (reconciling a number of studies and concluding that unionization does not increase productivity,
and thus that the increased wages may result in decreased profitability); cf. John T. Addison, The
Determinants of Firm Performance: Unions, Works Councils, and Employee Involvement/HighPerformance Work Practices, 52 Scot. J. Pol. Econ. 406, 416 (2005) (finding the small positive effect of
unionization on productivity unable to compensate for the increased wage expense). But see Christos
Doucouliagos & Patrice Laroche, What Do Unions Do to Productivity? A Meta-Analysis, 42 Indus.
Rel. 650, 682 (2003) (reporting results of a meta-regression analysis that found a neutral or positive
effect of unionization on productivity, especially in manufacturing).
42. Jody Hoffer Gittell et al., Mutual Gains or Zero-Sum? Labor Relations and Firm Performance
in the Airline Industry, 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 163, 174–77 & tbl.3 (2004).
43. Id.
44. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and
Information Technology on Productivity, 83 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 434, 444 (2001).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 440–41.
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survey of firms, finding the negative effect of wage increases on profit
was greater if a union imposed the wage increase than if the firm itself
47
imposed the increase.
Despite higher wages, union workers tend to report lower job
satisfaction than nonunion workers. Richard Freeman and James Medoff
synthesized a broad range of research and concluded that, while
unionization results in higher wages and fringe benefits, it also correlates
with decreased employee satisfaction, especially with respect to working
48
conditions and relationships with management. Similarly, a 1983
national survey found that unionized workers reported higher
satisfaction with pay than did nonunion workers, but lower satisfaction
with respect to work duties, coworkers, supervisors, and promotions,
49
leading to lower global satisfaction ratings.
Scholars have posed a number of theories to explain this apparent
paradox, including that: (1) “unions galvanize worker discontent in order
50
to make a strong case in negotiations with management”; (2) the
grievance and negotiation experience primes employees to perceive
51
negative conditions more saliently; (3) dissatisfied union workers
continue working under conditions where their nonunion counterparts
52
would quit, thereby self-selecting out of the dataset (the “exit-voice”
47. Harry J. Holzer, Wages, Employer Costs, and Employee Performance in the Firm, 43 Indus. &
Lab. Rel. Rev. (Special Issue) 147, 161–163 (1990). Empirical studies have uncovered manifold other
disadvantages that employers suffer as a result of unionization. See, e.g., Freeman & Medoff, supra
note 37, at 21 (less overall flexibility in business operations); Addison & Hirsch, supra note 41, at 99
(reduced investment in physical capital and research and development); David J. Flanagan & Satish P.
Deshpande, Top Management’s Perceptions of Changes in HRM Practices After Union Elections in
Small Firms: Implications for Building Competitive Advantage, 34 J. Small Bus. Mgmt. 23, 29–33 &
tbl.4 (1996) (reduced ability to implement “innovative” human-resource policies, such as merit-based
promotion and compensation and internal recruiting); Hirsch, supra note 39, at 436 (reduced
investment in physical capital and research and development).
48. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 37, at 21.
49. Chris J. Berger et al., Effects of Unions on Job Satisfaction: The Role of Work-Related Values
and Perceived Rewards, 32 Org. Behav. & Hum. Performance 289, 304, 308, 310, 314 (1983); see also
Tove Helland Hammer & Ariel Avgar, The Impact of Unions on Job Satisfaction, Organizational
Commitment, and Turnover, 26 J. Lab. Res. 241, 257 (2005) (synthesizing job-satisfaction research and
concluding that the negative impact on satisfaction is explained by dissatisfaction with job quality,
supervision, and the labor-management relations climate); Charles A. Odewahn & M.M. Petty, A
Comparison of Levels of Job Satisfaction, Role Stress, and Personal Competence Between Union
Members and Nonmembers, 23 Acad. Mgmt. J. 150, 153 (1980) (finding that union workers report
significantly lower satisfaction with work and pay than do nonmembers). But see Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
& David B. Balkan, Faculty Satisfaction with Pay and Other Job Dimensions Under Union and
Nonunion Conditions, 27 Acad. Mgmt. J. 591, 600 (1984) (finding that union faculty had higher pay
satisfaction, and finding no relationship between unionism and other aspects of satisfaction).
50. Freeman & Medoff, supra note 37, at 21.
51. George J. Borjas, Job Satisfaction, Wages, and Unions, 14 J. Hum. Resources 21, 38 (1979);
Hammer & Avgar, supra note 49, at 242–43.
52. Borjas, supra note 51; see also Joni Hersch & Joe A. Stone, Is Union Job Dissatisfaction
Real?, 25 J. Hum. Resources 736, 750 (1990) (reporting empirical results consistent with the exit-voice
hypothesis).
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hypothesis ); (4) poor labor-management relations drive dissatisfaction;
(5) union members seek out union jobs because these employees have
55
higher aspirations and expectations; and (6) unions organize where
56
working conditions are worse to begin with. Nonetheless, no single
theory has garnered a consensus.
In addition to the firm-based research cited above, anecdotal
evidence supports the argument that unionized businesses are less
profitable than are nonunion firms in the same sector. An example of
such anecdotal evidence is found in the hotel industry. Hotel owners and
operators believe that their union properties are less profitable than their
57
nonunion properties. Industry experts claim that union work rules
(regarding job duties and working hours) and health and welfare
obligations will make an organized hotel less profitable than a nonunion
58
hotel even if the latter has higher wages. Indeed, one hotel evaluator
stated that in evaluating a property for sale, unionization will, depending
59
on the contract and the union, result in a 10% to 20% decrease in value.
Another real estate investor stated that because of increased costs, the

53. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States (1970). Hirschman defined voice as the decision to complain about a
perceived deterioration of a condition or set of conditions experienced at an organization. Id. at 4. He
regarded voice as somewhat mutually exclusive to “exit” (the decision to remove oneself from the
offending condition). Id. He theorized, somewhat tautologically perhaps, that the likelihood of voice
increases with the degree of “loyalty” to the organization. Id. at 78. It should be noted that voice can
be conceptualized as a form of complaining about work conditions, or it can be characterized by
participation in a pluralist, democratic process. The latter is the view taken by institutionalists, see
John R. Commons, American Shoemakers, 1648–1895: A Sketch of Industrial Evolution, 24 Q.J. Econ.
39 (1909), and industrial relations scholars, see John W. Budd, Employment with a Human Face:
Balancing Efficiency, Equity, and Voice (2004); H.A. Clegg, Pluralism in Industrial Relations, 13
Brit. J. Indus. Rel. 309 (1975).
54. Keith A. Bender & Peter J. Sloane, Job Satisfaction, Trade Unions, and Exit-Voice Revisited,
51 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 222, 231–32 & tbls.3 & 4, 235 (1998); cf. James W. Carillon & Robert I.
Sutton, The Relationship Between Union Effectiveness and the Quality of Members’ Worklife,
3 J. Occupational Behav. 171, 178 (1982) (studying public schoolteachers and finding a positive effect
on job satisfaction when the union excelled in five areas: economic bargaining, member protection,
working-conditions bargaining, involving members in decisions, and improving relations with
coworkers).
55. See Alex Bryson et al., Does Union Membership Really Reduce Job Satisfaction?, 42 Brit. J.
Indus. Rel. 439, 452 (2004) (studying unionized employees in the U.K.); Hammer & Avgar, supra
note 49, at 258–59.
56. Borjas, supra note 51, at 28.
57. In November of 2008 Professor Sherwyn, who was serving as the academic director of the
Center for Hospitality Research, hosted a real estate finance roundtable at the law offices of
Proskauer Rose in New York City. The Roundtable featured hotel owners, operators, bankers,
consultants, deal makers, and professors. The consensus of the group was that unionized hotels would
provide lower returns than would nonunion hotels and that unionization could be a deal breaker in
many situations. See Ctr. for Hosp. Res., Cornell Univ. Sch. of Hotel Admin., Real Estate Finance
Roundtable (Nov. 10, 2008).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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unionization status of a hotel will determine whether or not a company
60
will purchase a property. Hotel operators contend that the inefficiencies
caused by union work rules discourage investors from investing in
properties because they will not provide an adequate return, causing a
61
reduction in those willing to build, own, or operate hotels. The logical
extension of this argument is that such investor decisions will not only
reduce jobs in the hotel industry, but that related industries such as
construction, food service, airlines, recreation, and retail will all suffer as
well.
While unions contest the argument that union hotels are less
62
profitable than nonunion properties, they also ask, “so what?” Union
advocates argue that exchanging profits for higher wages, increased job
63
security, employee voice, and all other union benefits is a positive trade.
Indeed, union advocates can compare the wages and benefits in
unionized cities like New York and Las Vegas to, for example, Dallas
and Atlanta and show that in unionized hotels, housekeepers and
banquet waiters lead middle-class and, sometimes, upper-middle-class
64
lives. Alternatively, employer advocates may point to the fact that
nonunion hotels in Chicago and San Francisco pay higher wages than
65
their unionized counterparts. Unionists argue that it is the threat of
unionization that causes the high wages and that the free-rider problem
66
should be eliminated, not perpetuated.
Despite the assertions from those on both sides of the debate that
the U.S. would be better off were it to favor either labor or capital, there
is no clear answer to this question and, thus, neither the parties’ opinions
nor their lobbying dollars should define national policy on this matter.
Instead, we argue that the focus should be on the microdata. The
evidence, however, is mixed. Employees are better off, but less satisfied,
60. Paul Wagner, an attorney with Stokes, Roberts, & Wagner, was hired by a major real estate
developer to examine whether the developer could open a nonunion hotel in a city with a neutrality
agreement. Wagner reports that the developer stated that he could not afford to open the hotel if it
were unionized. Interview with Paul Wagner, Attorney, Stokes, Roberts & Wagner, in Ithaca, N.Y.
(Aug. 21, 2010).
61. See Real Estate Finance Roundtable, supra note 57.
62. In a 2006 speech at Cornell University’s School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Workers
United president Bruce Raynor stated that union hotels are more profitable and provide better service
than nonunion properties. Raynor admitted he had no data to support this statement. Bruce Raynor,
President, Workers United, Address at Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Labor Rel. (Oct. 26, 2006).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. At the Tenth Annual Labor and Employment Roundtable sponsored by Cornell’s Schools of
Hotel Administration, Industrial & Labor Relations, and Law, hotel negotiators stated that many
nonunion hotels in Chicago and San Francisco pay higher wages than do union properties. See Cornell
Univ. Sch. of Hotel Admin., Labor & Employment Roundtable (May 15, 2011).
66. See Raynor, supra note 62; see also Ozkan Eren, Does Membership Pay Off for Covered
Workers? A Distributional Analysis of the Free Rider Problem, 62 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 367, 367–68
(2009).
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when unionized. Unionized employers enjoy lower profits than nonunion
firms. Without evidence to support either side’s macro position, we
should not enact labor law reform whose sole purpose is to either
enhance or reduce union influence. Instead, we contend that national
policy regarding union organizing should be to ensure that the system is
fair. Below, we define what we believe to be fair and then analyze (1) the
current system, (2) labor’s preferred system (neutrality agreements with
card check or EFCA), and (3) the latest proposed fix to the problem—
short elections. After explaining why these systems fail to meet our
definition of fairness, we introduce the moral principles of union
organizing embodied in a contractual arrangement between management
and labor and explain why this system should be enacted.

II. What Is Fair?
Commentators, scholars, legislators, and advocates seem to
habitually overweigh the results of systems (such as adjudication
outcomes or election results) to determine the fairness of systems being
evaluated. For example, there is substantial literature comparing the
results of discrimination cases resolved in litigation with those resolved in
67
arbitration. One underlying theme of this work is that systems are fair if
68
they have comparable results. Alternatively, according to some, there is
69
a positive relationship between plaintiff victories and fairness. Similarly,
there are those who point to the results of union-organizing drives and
elections and make conclusions about the fairness of the process by
70
looking at the results. The system is fair, according to some, if the union
wins the majority of elections and is unfair when the union win rate
drops. In fact, we contend that, standing alone, the results of an
67. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path
for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1557, 1567–78, 1586–91 (2005) (reviewing prior empirical
research and presenting the results of a case study finding arbitration faster and more efficient than
litigation); Frederick L. Sullivan, Accepting Evolution in Workplace Justice: The Need for Congress to
Mandate Arbitration, 26 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 281, 308–12 (2004); see also Curtis Brown, CostEffective, Fast and Fair: What the Empirical Data Indicate About ADR, Metro. Corp. Counsel, Nov.
2004, at 56, 70 (summarizing several empirical studies comparing litigation with arbitration); Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical
Comparison, Disp. Resol. J., Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 48 & tbl.1; Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at
Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American
Arbitration Association, 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 777, 824 (2003); Lewis L. Maltby, Private
Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 29, 46 (1998).
68. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 67, at 309 (asserting that arbitration is fair to plaintiffs because
they are more successful in arbitration than in litigation).
69. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1247, 1262–
63 (2009) (arguing that the empirical evidence tends to suggest that mandatory arbitration is unfair, as
measured by aggregate pro-plaintiff dispositions).
70. Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, The Impact of Employer Opposition on Union
Certification Win Rates: A Private/Public Sector Comparison (Econ. Policy Inst., Working Paper No. 113,
1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/19/.
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adjudication system or a union-representation election do not reveal
anything about fairness, regardless of how many cases are analyzed.
An analogy illustrates our point. Assume one of the Authors of this
Article, a middle-aged professor who was once an average high school
basketball player on a bad high school team, is set to play ten games of
one-on-one basketball. The rules are as follows: games to eleven, one
point for each basket, the scorer keeps possession of the ball, and players
call their own fouls. The professor loses all ten games 11–0. An argument
that the rules of the games played were unfair based solely on the
observed outcomes is flawed because it does not account for the identity
of the professor’s opponent. If it turns out that the opponent is Michael
Jordan (regarded as one of the greatest players ever to play the game
professionally), claims that the games were “unfair” are undoubtedly
spurious at worst and grossly incomplete at best. Conversely, if
Professors Sherwyn and Eigen were to play ten games and the rules were
such that Eigen had to adhere to the regular rules of basketball, but
Sherwyn got to shoot on a basket that was eight feet off the ground (two
feet closer to the ground than a regulation basketball rim), did not have
to dribble the ball, and was allowed to foul Eigen, we would hopefully
agree that the rules were unfair, regardless of the results. Outcomes
alone do not define fairness, nor should they automatically lead one to
71
assume unfair rules or cheating.
The fairness correlation between rules and outcomes can be
assessed only if we have determinative information prior to the time that
we invoke the system. In sports, we would need to know the abilities of
the teams. If the teams are equal, then a fair system would result in each
team winning about half the games. In discrimination claims, we would
need to know if the employer violated the law. Thus, if plaintiffs who go
to trial in discrimination cases were in fact discriminated against 90% of
the time, a fair system should generate approximately a 90% employee
win rate. If plaintiffs were discriminated against only 10% of the time, we
should expect to see a 10% win rate. With respect to discrimination,
because the trial determines liability, we cannot judge the fairness of the
system merely by analyzing results. Put another way, the so-called “base

71. Interestingly, if instead of Sherwyn versus Eigen in the second hypothetical set of games, it
were again Sherwyn versus Michael Jordan, and Sherwyn received the benefit not being bound by the
standard rules, one might argue for a different view of the fairness of the system. If one expects the
players to be unequal in terms of resources available, one would be more likely to perceive
unbalanced rules as leveling a playing field and, hence, as more fair. In the employment setting, one
might perceive employers as possessing more resources and information and, hence, if the rules of
litigation applied to employers the same way as employees, one would expect outcomes to
disproportionately favor employers. Ironically, attempts made to level the litigation playing field by
giving employees greater access to adjudication on the merits via arbitration are sometimes perceived
as a creating a less fair system than litigation.
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72

rate fallacy” underlies our complaint about fairness here. Without
information on the reference category’s base rate (how much employers
discriminate in our example above), there is insufficient information on
which to base a decision on fairness. This often does not stop people
from making incorrect assumptions or backing into assumptions, as
73
described above.
Union advocates often argue that in union elections we do in fact
know employees’ desires prior to the election system. As explained
74
below, to petition for an election, unions need 30%, but often get over
60%, of employees to sign cards saying they wish to be represented by
75
the union. Because unions almost always have enough support to win
an election before the campaign begins, they contend that the system is
unfair because despite such support, unions lose anywhere from 28% to
76
69% of elections each year. In fact, according to a recent study of 22,382
organizing drives occurring between 1994 and 2004 that filed an election
77
petition, secret-ballot elections were held in only 14,615 (65%). Of
78
those 14,615 elections, unions won 8155, or 56%.
However, many employees sign authorization cards not because
they want a union, but because they are willing to vote for or against a
79
union in a secret-ballot election. This might be due to the low perceived
cost of saying yes to such a process, or it might be due to employees not
wanting to be a hold out if other employees want to vote. It might reflect
employees’ respect for the American ideal of the democratic process of
voting for one’s representative, even if employees sign cards planning to
vote against the union. It might be due to lawful (or unlawful) pressure
exerted by union organizers on employees. Moreover, the signing of
cards represents the culmination of the union’s unilateral attempt to
organize the employees. During the card-signing time the employees
hear only one side of the story. By the time of the election, employees
have heard both sides and may make a more informed decision. Is it
possible that employers intimidate and otherwise unfairly influence

72. Jonathan J. Koehler, The Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive, Normative, and
Methodological Challenges, 19 Behav. & Brain Sci. 1, 1 (1996) (using an example of a coach on an
Olympic basketball team trying to decide between two players to make a final attempt at shooting the
game-winning basket, to illustrate the author’s point on base-rate fallacy).
73. Id.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (2010).
75. See Andrew W. Martin, The Institutional Logic of Union Organizing and the Effectiveness of
Social Movement Repertoires, 113 Am. J. Soc. 1067, 1072 (2008) (contending that many unions will not
file for a certification election until a majority of workers sign authorization cards).
76. See id. at 1089 tbl.7, 1096 fig.A-2.
77. John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union Organizing
Drives, 1999–2004, 62 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 3, 6 tbl.1 (2009).
78. Id.
79. See Terrible Tactics, SEIU Exposed, http://www.seiuexposed.com/tactics.cfm (last visited Feb.
14, 2012).
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employees? Of course. On the other hand, the drop in union support
could be the result of more complete information. For example, few
would argue that an election for political office was unfair if the following
occurred: the voters were introduced to one candidate, were inundated
with positive information about the candidate, overwhelmingly signed a
petition approving the candidate’s ability to run for office, and then
voted for a second candidate who came onto the scene four weeks before
the election and told a better story than the first candidate.
Union losses could also reflect significant change in American taste
for organized labor and collective rights and voice in the workplace. For
example, from the 1940s through the 1970s, the height of the privatesector union movement, pro-union messages abounded in popular
culture. Anecdotally, but for purposes of illustration and comparison,
80
Woody Guthrie sang about joining unions, textile workers had little
81
kids singing “look for the union label,” and Sally Field won the
Academy Award in 1979 for her role as employee and union organizer
82
Norma Rae. Even On the Waterfront, a 1954 Academy Award-winning
83
film that portrayed unions in less than positive terms, concluded with
84
employees getting their union back and running it on the “up and up.”
Today, in contrast, unions are the entities that cost us the World Series in
85
1994, have parents and education advocates Waiting for “Superman” to
86
break union power, and are being blamed for driving states into near
87
bankruptcy. Accordingly, a 2009 Gallup poll indicated a sharp decline
in Americans’ approval of labor unions—48% approve, down from 59%
88
the year before. A corresponding poll in 2010 reported a 52% approval
89
rating. For comparison, in 1936 and 1957, the approval ratings were
90
72% and 75%, respectively.

80. Woody Guthrie, Union Maid, on Hard Travelin’: The Asch Recordings, Vol. 3
(Smithsonian Folkways Recordings 1999); Woody Guthrie, Union Burying Ground, on Struggle
(Smithsonian Folkways Recordings 1990).
81. See Look for the Union Label Commercial (1981).
82. See Oscar Legacy: The 52nd Academy Awards, Acad. Motion Picture Arts & Sci.,
http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/legacy/ceremony/52nd.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
83. See Oscar Legacy: The 27th Academy Awards, Acad. Motion Picture Arts & Sci.,
http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/legacy/ceremony/27th.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
84. On the Waterfront (Columbia Pictures 1954).
85. See Year in Review: 1994 National League, Baseball Almanac, http://www.baseballalmanac.com/yearly/yr1994n.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2012);
86. Waiting for “Superman” (Electric Kinney Films 2010).
87. See, e.g., Can You Blame Unions for Golden State’s Fiscal Problems?, Fox Bus. (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://video.foxbusiness.com/v/1243118545001/can-you-blame-unions-for-golden-states-fiscal-problems/.
88. Lydia Saad, Labor Unions See Sharp Slide in U.S. Public Support, Gallup (Sept. 3, 2009)
http://www.gallup.com/poll/122744/Labor-Unions-Sharp-Slide-Public-Support.aspx.
89. Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Approval of Labor Unions Remains near Record Low, Gallup (Aug.
12, 2010) http://www.gallup.com/poll/142007/Americans-Approval-Labor-Unions-Remains-Near-RecordLow.aspx.
90. Id.
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In Wisconsin, Governor Scott Walker introduced a “Budget
91
Repair” bill on February 11, 2011, that directly targets unions. As of the
writing of this Article, several other states, including Tennessee, Ohio,
92
and Nevada, are expected to follow suit. Four states’ attorneys general
have announced their intention to “vigorously defend” state
93
On
constitutional provisions mandating secret-ballot elections.
February 1, 2012, the Indiana Senate voted 28–22 to pass a right-to-work
94
bill, making Indiana the twenty-third state in the nation with such a law,
and legislators in Michigan (long known as the strongest of union states)
are contemplating a proposal that would make that state the nation’s
95
twenty-fourth right-to-work state.
Do employees want to be represented by unions? Are Americans
now more anti-union than we were in the Fifties? Does full information
lead to greater unionization or to union losses? Do unions fail to
organize because employers intimidate employees? Because there are
simply too many uncontrollable factors to judge, we contend that
election results simply do not provide evidence of whether or not the
system itself is fair. Accordingly, it is time to change the paradigm on
how we judge fairness.
We contend that a fair system will result in employees believing that
they had enough information to make an informed decision, that they
were respected, and that they were not intimidated, threatened or
coerced. Such a system would be fair regardless of whether unions win or
lose the majority of elections held. Below, we examine the current and
proposed systems to see if they are fair under our new standard. We also

91. See Governor Walker Introduces Budget Repair, ScottWalker.org (Feb. 1i, 2011),
http://www.scottwalker.org/news/2011/02/governor-walker-introduces-budget-repair.
92. Republicans Challenging Unions in State Capitols, ABCNews.com (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12946800.
93. Letter from Alan Wilson, S.C. Att’y Gen., et al., to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel,
NLRB (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/ag4_letter_to_nlrb_
gc_1-27-2011.pdf; see also Lawrence E. Dube, Four States Defend Secret Ballot Laws, as GOP Senators
Back Them with New Bill, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at AA-1 (Jan. 27, 2011).
94. Susan Guyett, Indiana Becomes 23rd “Right-to-Work” State, Reuters, Feb. 1, 2012, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-unions-indiana-righttowork-idUSTRE81018920120201.
95. See H.R. 6348, 95th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2010). For the twenty-two other right-to-work
states’ laws, see Ariz. Const. art XXV; Ark. Const. amend. XXXIV; Fla. Const. art. I, § 6; Kan.
Const. art. XV, § 12; Miss. Const. art. VII, § 198-A; Neb. Const. art. XV, § 13; Okla. Const. art.
XXIII, § 1A; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 2; Ala. Code § 25-7-30 (2011); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-6-21 (2010);
Idaho Code Ann. § 44-2003 (2011); Iowa Code §§ 731.1–.8 (2011); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:981
(2011); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 613.130, 613.230, 613.250 (2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-80 (2011); N.D.
Cent. Code § 34-01-14 (2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-7-10 (2011); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-201 (2011);
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 101.301 (2011); Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-34-1 to -17 (2011); Va. Code Ann.
§§ 40.1-58 to -69 (2011); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-7-108 to -115 (2011). New Hampshire’s recent right-towork proposal, H.R. 474-FN, 2011 Leg. (N.H. 2011), was vetoed by the governor. See Governor
Lynch’s Veto Message Regarding HB 474, N.H. Off. Governor (May 11, 2011),
http://www.governor.nh.gov/media/news/2011/051111-veto-hb474.htm.
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analyze the current and proposed systems to see if they would solve the
problems they wish to resolve and would produce desired results.

III. The Traditional System for Union Organizing and
Attempts to Reform It
The union-organizing process begins in one of several ways.
96
Sometimes, dissatisfied employees seek out a union. Other times,
97
unions initiate discussions with employees. In fact, organizers may enter
an employer’s property and hand out authorization cards or set up picket
98
lines at the entrances and exits to the property. Unions may use current
99
employees to “sell” the union to coworkers. Finally, unions sometimes
send their members to apply for jobs with nonunion employers the
100
unions wish to organize. Regardless of how the organizing begins, the
union must soon meet with a number of employees to see if there is
interest in organizing.
A. NLRB Rules for Organizing and Secret-Ballot Elections
The NLRA sets forth the laws regulating this form of employee
101
organization. Under those rules, before any labor organization can be
certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for any group of
employees, the employees in that group, called a bargaining unit, vote for
or against union representation in a secret-ballot election monitored by
102
the NLRB. In most cases, the NLRB seeks to schedule such an election
approximately six to eight weeks after the union initiates the process by
103
filing a representation petition. This time period may be extended if the

96. Employees often seek out unions because of perceived failures in one or more of five key
areas: lack of recognition, weak management, poor communication, substandard working conditions,
and noncompetitive wages and benefits. See Martin Jay Levitt, Confessions of a Union Buster 49
(1993).
97. Labor Union Organizing in the United States Workplace, HRHero.com, http://www.hrhero.com/
topics/union.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
98. See, e.g., Johnson & Hardin Co. v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 237, 240–42 (6th Cir. 1995) (enforcing a
NLRB order finding that an employer unlawfully interfered with its employees’ section 7 rights where
the employer excluded union representatives from distributing union literature on state-owned
property outside the employer’s place of business).
99. See Labor Union Organizing, supra note 97.
100. The applicants’ reason for seeking employment is to organize the real employees. This
method, referred to as “salting,” was the subject of a Supreme Court case in which the Court held that
an employer cannot refuse to hire a “salt” simply because the real reason the employee seeks
employment with the company is to organize it. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85,
96–98 (1995).
101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2010).
102. Id. § 159(e)(1).
103. See Customer Service Standards: Representation Cases, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/
customer-service-standards#representation (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). In 2010, the median time period
between filing the petition and the initial election was thirty-eight days, and 95.1% of all initial
elections occurred within fifty-six days of the filing. Memorandum GC 11-03 from Lafe E. Solomon,
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employer contests the bargaining unit or if other issues arise. In a
recent study of 22,382 organizing drives from 1999–2004, the average
case that went to election did so in forty-one days, and 95% of elections
105
were held within seventy-five days of filing. It is during this time
period, often referred to quite appropriately as the “campaign period,”
that employers and unions try to persuade the voting employees.
Unionists argue that more time translates into more opportunities for
management to threaten, intimidate, and coerce employees into voting
106
against the union. Others posit that more time in the campaign period
translates into a greater likelihood that employees will render informed
107
decisions on voting day. Regardless of which is correct, it is clear that
108
delay helps management. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that even
109
a one-day delay can affect the election in the employer’s favor.
Under the NLRB’s rules, a union may request the secret-ballot
election only if a minimum of 30% of the employees in an appropriate
110
bargaining unit have signed authorization cards. As a practical matter,
however, most national unions will not file a petition unless at least 60%
111
of the employees have signed cards. To prevail in the election, the
union needs a simple majority of those who actually vote, not a majority
112
of those who would be represented in the bargaining unit. Thus, if fifty
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Employees of the Office of the Gen. Counsel 5 (Jan. 10, 2011), available at
http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d4580434379.
104. Gordon Lafer, Am. Rights at Work, Free and Fair? How Labor Law Fails U.S.
Democratic Election Standards 22 (2005).
105. Ferguson, supra note 77, at 10 n.9.
106. John Logan et al., U.C. Berkeley Ctr. for Labor Research. & Educ., New Data: NLRB
Process Fails to Ensure a Fair Vote 2–4 (2011).
107. See Richard Epstein, The Case Against the Employee Free Choice Act 25–26 (Univ. of Chi.
Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 452, 2009).
108. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 14 (noting the negative impact of delay on union election win
rates). See generally Myron Roomkin & Richard N. Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of
Representation Elections: Some Empirical Evidence, 1981 U. Ill. L. Rev. 75 (presenting a model of
election outcomes that includes delay as a significant predictor).
109. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 14.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (2010).
111. Telephone Interview with Richard W. Hurd, Professor of Indus. & Lab. Rel., Cornell Univ.
(June 28, 2001); accord Jack Fiorito, Union Organizing in the United States, in Union Organizing:
Campaigning for Trade Union Recognition 191, 200 (Gregor Gall ed., 2003); Martin, supra note 75,
at 1072 (contending that many unions will not file for a certification election until a majority of
workers sign authorization cards). Frankly, this is a conservative estimate based on conversations the
Authors have had with union officials over the past seven years. Some assert that the percentage of
employees the union considers supporters (based on authorization card signatures) is between 75%
and 90%.
112. The relevant provision reads: “Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Although this
language seems to require a majority of all employees in a bargaining unit, it has been interpreted to
require only a majority of those employees who vote. Marlin-Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 586,
588 (2d Cir. 1941).
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employees are in the proposed bargaining unit but only twenty-one vote,
the union needs only eleven votes to win. Employers win in the event of
113
a tie.
B. NLRB Rules Regarding Campaigning Before Elections and
Arguments About the Effects of the Rules on the Process
The current rules state that during the campaign period, employers
114
115
116
may not threaten, interrogate, make promises to, or engage in
117
surveillance of employees. In addition, employers may not solicit
118
119
grievances or confer benefits. If the employer violates these rules, the
NLRB may either order the election to be rerun or issue a bargaining
120
order.
Under the law, employers may, however, engage in numerous
campaign activities to convince employees to vote against the union.
During the campaign period, employers provide employees with the
management perspective of employees’ rights and the consequences of
121
voting in favor of the union. To get their message across, employers can

113. C.J. Krehbiel Co. v. NLRB, 844 F.2d 880, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
114. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2010); NLRB v. St. Francis Healthcare Ctr., 212 F.3d 945, 962 (6th Cir.
2000) (finding that the employer unlawfully interfered with a representation election by threatening to
close the facility if the union were elected).
115. See Tamper, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 907, 938 (1973) (finding an unfair labor practice where the
employer coercively interrogated its employees about their union sympathies).
116. See NLRB v. Wis-Pak Foods, Inc., 125 F.3d 518, 522–23 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that a promise
to increase wages constituted an unlawful promise of benefit); Gen. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 627,
637 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that a promise of a postelection gift constituted an unlawful promise of
benefit).
117. See Cal. Acrylic Indus., Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 41, 63 (1996) (finding that the employer violated
the Act where it videotaped meetings between employees and union representatives).
118. See NLRB v. V & S Schuler Eng’g, Inc., 309 F.3d 362, 371 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the
employer violated the Act by soliciting grievances when he had not done so before, creating a
“compelling inference that he is implicitly promising to correct those inequities . . . mak[ing] union
representation unnecessary” (quoting Orbit Lightspeed Courier Sys., 323 N.L.R.B. 380, 393 (1997))).
119. Wis-Pak, 125 F.3d at 522, 524–25 (finding that favorable changes to overtime and attendance
policies constituted an unlawful grant of benefits).
120. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969) (upholding the NLRB’s power to order
the employer to bargain with the union where the employer’s unfair labor practices are so severe that
ordering a new election is not an adequate remedy, and where the union can demonstrate previous
majority support). A bargaining order is an NLRB mandate requiring a company to “cease and desist
from their unfair labor practices, to offer reinstatement and back pay to the employees who had been
discriminatorily discharged, to bargain with the union on request, and to post the appropriate notices.”
Id. at 614.
121. As long as informing employees of the consequences does not rise to the level of a threat.
29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2010). Employers typically raise some or all of the following issues, based in part
on advice from counsel and from their unique circumstances, industry, and employee demographics:
whether unions may “guarantee” increased pay, benefits, or anything else; how collective bargaining
really works; what happens when strikes are called or picketing is conducted; what it costs to be a
union member in terms of dues and initiation fees; where that money goes, how it is used, and by
whom; whether the union’s leaders are trustworthy and capable; the employer’s record of
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and will require all employees to attend so-called “captive audience”
122
123
speeches, will send letters home, and will spend significant time and
money on communicating their message, often employing law firms and
consulting firms that specialize in crafting anti-union campaign
124
125
strategies. Management may mandate attendance at their meetings.
126
Unions may not hold captive-audience speeches and, in fact, have no
127
right to come onto an employer’s property. Unions are, however,
128
entitled to a list of eligible employees and, unlike employers, no rule
prohibits unions from making promises, interrogating employees, or
129
soliciting grievances. Both sides may lie to employees but may not
130
provide the employees with forgeries intended to deceive.

responsiveness to employee issues; the fact that employees will be paying someone to do what they
may have been able to do (represent themselves) for free; whether the organizing drive has actually
been beneficial in the sense that it has called attention to problems that need to be addressed whether
the union is there or not; and whether the employer should make management changes (because an
organizing drive seems to have been triggered by a perceived lack of leadership). See Arch Stokes,
Robert L. Murphy, Paul E. Wagner & David S. Sherwyn, How Unions Organize New Hotels Without
an Employee Ballot: Neutrality Agreements, 42 Cornell Hospitality Q. 86 (2001).
122. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers,
Wages, and Union Organizing 73 tbl.8 (2000) (finding that, of four hundred union campaigns
studied, 92% included captive-audience meetings).
123. Id. However, in-person visits by management to employees’ homes are per se prohibited. See
Gen. Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948). The union, on the other hand, may make home visits, as
long as those visits are not threatening or coercive. Cf. Simo v. Union of Needletrades, 322 F.3d 602,
620–21 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Supreme Court and NLRB cases suggesting that union home visits
are permissible).
124. See Kate Bronfenbrenner et al., Introduction, in Organizing to Win: New Research on
Union Strategies 1, 4 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998).
125. See Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953); see also Estlund, supra note 8, at
1536–37.
126. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of Am., 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958) (stating, of captiveaudience speeches, that unions are not “entitled to use a medium of communication simply because
the employer is using it”); see also Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. at 406.
127. See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992); see also Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 342 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945) (finding rules against solicitation during work hours
presumptively valid); cf. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1955) (creating an
exception to the rule that an employer may bar nonemployee union members from the employer’s
property when the location of the employees’ workplace and homes make reasonable nontrespassory
efforts ineffective); Supervalu Holdings, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 425, 425 (2006) (finding a no-distribution
rule invalid because it was enforced discriminatorily against union activity); Dillon Cos., 340 N.L.R.B.
1260, 1260 (2003) (finding unlawful a no-solicitation rule that was previously unenforced but
resurrected at the beginning of the union’s campaign).
128. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966) (establishing the disclosure
requirement); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 767 (1969) (affirming the Excelsior rule).
129. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 1311 (1977); Shirlington Supermarket,
Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 666, 667 (1953). But see Stericycle, Inc., 37 N.L.R.B. No. 61, 2010-2011 NLRB Dec.
¶ 15,471 (Aug. 23, 2011) (holding that a union could not initiate litigation during the critical period).
130. See Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982) (“[W]e will no longer probe into
the truth or falsity of the parties’ campaign statements, and . . . we will not set elections aside on the
basis of misleading campaign statements. We will, however, intervene in cases where a party has used
forged documents which render the voters unable to recognize propaganda for what it is.”); see also
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Employers could argue that the ability to interact socially with
employees provides unions with a level playing field (at worst), and a
significant advantage (at best). Not surprisingly, unions often hold a very
different view of campaigns. Union advocates contend that the reason for
labor’s failure to organize, and the consequential drop in union density,
131
is that the rules of organizing unfairly favor employers. The assumption
is that employers intimidate employees and either violate the law with
impunity because there is no real enforcement, or act within the law
because objectionable and effective conduct is not unlawful, but should
be. Indeed, union advocates claim that during most campaigns,
employers illegally threaten, intimidate, and terminate employees who
132
favor the union. According to a 2005 report by the University of Illinois
at Chicago’s Center for Urban Economic Development, when faced with
organizing drives, 30% of employers fire pro-union workers, 49%
threaten to close a worksite if the union prevails, and 51% coerce
133
workers into opposing unions with bribery or favoritism. Unions point
to the numerous unfair-labor-practice charges filed against employers, to
evidence suggesting a connection between meritorious unfair-labor134
practice charges filed and a lower likelihood of union election victories,
and to anecdotal evidence of outrageous employer behavior, and
contend that because unions lose numerous elections, the system is
unfair.
Others advance the related theory that employers pose stronger
resistance to unions by pressing on the weak spots in the law and that the
135
law has responded inadequately. According to Paul Weiler:
[T]he employer . . . will be tempted to utilize a variety of measures
designed to make collective bargaining unpalatable to its employees: a
vigorous campaign against the union in which management regularly
raises the spectre of strikes and job losses, and adds credibility to the

Metro. Life Ins. Co., 266 N.L.R.B. 507, 507–08 (1983); Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of StateBased Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in the United States, 29 Comp. Lab.
L. & Pol’y J. 209, 209 (2008).
131. See William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law
and Reality Once Again, 36 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 560, 570–71 (1983) (concluding that employers’
captive-audience speeches have statistically significant effects on voting in union-certification
elections).
132. Id.; see Bronfenbrenner, supra note 122, at 73 tbl.8.
133. Chirag Mehta & Nik Theodore, Am. Rights at Work, Undermining the Right to
Organize: Employer Behavior During Union Representation Campaigns 5, 9 (2005); accord
Bronfenbrenner, supra note 122, at 73 tbl.8 (reporting similarly staggering statistics, including that, of
employers in 400 union campaigns, 34% used bribes or special favors, 48% made unlawful promises of
improvement, and 25% discharged union activists); Bronfenbrenner et al., supra note 124, at 1, 4–5.
134. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 15 tbl.6 (finding that meritorious unfair labor practice charges
filed by unions against employers had a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of unions
winning elections, reducing the success rate by 52%).
135. Paul C. Weiler, Governing the Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law
111 (1990).
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threats through selective discriminatory action against key union
supporters. If the union wins the election nonetheless, the employer
will simply carry on its resistance at the next stage by stonewalling at
the bargaining table, forcing the union members out on strike, and
136
hiring permanent replacements to fill their jobs . . . .

Weiler cites as evidence the increase of discriminatory discharges
137
and bad faith bargaining during the period of decline in union density.
Craver contends that employers engage in tactics during organizing
drives that chill employees from voicing pro-union opinions and
regularly hire labor consultants to strategize the anti-unionization
138
campaign. They openly encourage dissatisfied union workers to file
decertification petitions, contributing to the jump from 300
139
decertification elections in the 1960s to 900 in the early 1980s. Given
the choice, companies will prefer to invest in their nonunion plants rather
than their union plants (which explains the growth of production plants in
140
the Sunbelt—where workers are less supportive of labor organizations).
Similarly, Richard Freeman and Morris Kleiner analyzed employer and
organizer surveys and concluded that employers’ brazen opposition to
141
unionization contributed to union decline. They based this conclusion
on the finding that supervisor opposition to unionization was the most
142
significant determinant of representation-election outcomes.
Other scholars argue that fundamental macroeconomic changes,
143
Kate
like globalization, do much to explain the decline.
Bronfenbrenner advances a combined theory of increased capital
144
She explains that
mobility and increased employer opposition.
employers have greater ability and willingness to close plants and
145
outsource those activities, or to threaten to do so. Between this and

136. Id. (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 112.
138. Charles A. Craver, Can Unions Survive? The Rejuvenation of the American Labor
Movement 49 (1993).
139. Id. at 50.
140. Id.
141. Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union
Organizing Drives, 43 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 351, 364 (1990).
142. Id. at 361. Interestingly, Freeman and Kleiner also found that the use of unfair campaign
tactics by employers is positively correlated with the odds that the union will win, in seeming
contradiction to the assertions of some union advocates. Id.; accord Julius G. Getman, Explaining the
Fall of the Labor Movement, 41 St. Louis Univ. L.J. 575, 582 (1997) (acknowledging that his own
research uncovered no relationship between employer success and illegal tactics). This finding is also
at odds with recent findings by John-Paul Ferguson that nonmeritorious unfair-labor-practice charges
had little impact on election results as compared to meritorious ones, which significantly decreased the
odds that unions would win. Ferguson, supra note 77, at 18.
143. Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 3, 6 (1993) (attributing the decline in part to the rise of competitive product markets).
144. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 122, at 53.
145. Id.
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other employer anti-union tactics, employers are extremely effective at
146
avoiding unionization.
Employers and some scholars argue that unions have nothing left to
147
sell to employees because traditional labor-management relations
148
simply do not serve employees’ interests and unions are perceived as
less trustworthy due to their inability to carry through on promises
149
made. Others attribute the drop in union density to internal union
150
weaknesses.
We contend that organized labor has failed to adapt with the times,
and part of this failure is due to unions’ failure to connect to a new
generation of workers. Younger workers may aspire less to be lifetime
employees with great benefits and job security and more to be like
management, independent contractors, entrepreneurs, inventors, or
someone who attains celebrity status and avoids work for the rest of her
life. Others have argued that collective employment rights have been
eclipsed by the staggering enactment of legislation protecting individual
151
employee rights. Some point to shifts in the U.S. economy, in particular
that it is moving towards an “enterprise based” system of industrial
relations in private industry in which unions negotiate with single firms
152
instead of with corporations or industries. Such shifts preclude the kind
146. Id.
147. According to management-side labor lawyers, one of the key strategies in this regard is to
examine what the union is selling and to explain to the employees that the costs outweigh the benefits.
One problem for the unions, according to some, is that organized labor does not always have much to
sell. For example, one lawyer discussed a union-organizing drive in which the union represented to
employees that it would demand that the employer implement the union’s health insurance plan if it
were elected. The union extolled the fact that it would insist that the employer pay 100% of the cost of
the plan, as opposed to their current plan under which the employees paid a portion of the cost. The
employer held a meeting in which it compared the two plans side-by-side. While the union plan did not
feature any up-front costs, the coverage was clearly so inferior that the employees concluded that they
were better off with the employer plan and voted against the union. Employers contend that this
insurance issue is a typical example of the current state of union organizing: at first, the union pitch
sounds great, but after close examination the employees do not want to buy what the union is selling.
Employers could argue that this is one reason why companies are able to defeat unions in elections.
148. Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Workers Want 56 (1999) (finding a desire
among employees for an organization run “jointly” by both labor and management).
149. See supra note 147.
150. Bronfenbrenner et al. suggested that unions focused too little effort on recruitment during the
1970s and 1980s and failed to adapt their organizing strategies to new challenges. Bronfenbrenner et
al., supra note 124, at 5–6. Julius Getman agrees that unions’ failure to adapt their thinking
contributed to the demise, and points to other internal weaknesses: internal politics, inability to
coordinate with other locals, corruption, and a divide between leadership and rank-and-file
employees. See Getman, supra note 142, at 583–93.
151. Michael J. Piore & Sean Safford, Changing Regimes of Workplace Governance, Shifting Axes
of Social Mobilization, and the Challenge to Industrial Relations Theory, 45 Indus. Rel. 319, 301–04
(2006).
152. Ronald W. Schatz, From Commons to Dunlop: Rethinking the Field and Theory of Industrial
Relations, in Industrial Democracy in America: The Ambiguous Promise 87, 88 (Nelson
Lichtenstein & Howell John Harris eds., 1993).
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of industrial democracy and industrial stability based on unionism that
153
industrial-relations theorists and union advocates have contemplated.
Still others mark the advent of enlightened human-resource policies as
154
explaining labor’s inability to organize and the drop in union density.
In fact, management often contends that simply informing employees of
155
the “truth” will allow them to prevail. Therefore, employers argue that
the system is fair because the lack of union density reflects the will of the
people. These theories are consistent with the staggering decline in
156
public support for unions. Unionists argue that the statistics prove that
157
the system is unfair. We contend that the system is unfair not because
158
of the results, but because of the process.
Like the Sherwyn-versus-Eigen hypothetical one-on-one basketball
game described above, the current system has two different sets of rules
for the two sides. Employers have the advantage of access to employees.
Captive-audience meetings and other impromptu conversations allow
employers to get their respective messages across. Unions have the
advantage of being able to make promises, visit employees’ homes, and
party with the employees. Employers have the inherent power
advantage, while unions often have a head start in the race to the
election. There are some rules that apply to both sides. Both sides can lie
to the employees, trash the other side, and pressure the employees to
159
vote one way or the other. The result is that at the end of the campaign,
the employees feel like the rope in a tug of war. The employees likely
have little, if any, ability to gauge the accuracy of the information
received; they often fear reprisals for voting for either side, and they
likely feel like pawns in the age-old labor-versus-capital dispute where

153. Id.
154. Jack Fiorito & Cheryl L. Maranto, The Contemporary Decline of Union Strength, Contemp.
Pol’y Issues, Oct. 1987, at 12, 16–17.
155. Surveys of union organizers and employees who have been through NLRB election
campaigns seem to confirm this trend, at least indirectly. See, e.g., Workers Weigh in on Alleged
Coercion During Card Check Campaign and NLRB Elections, Am. Rights at Work (Mar. 21, 2006)
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/press-center/2006-press-releases/workers-weigh-in-on-allegedcoercion-during-card-check-campaigns-and-nlrb-elections-20060320-239-345-345.html.
156. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
157. There are those who go beyond the statistics and make a normative assessment of the NLRA,
arguing that it is biased in favor of employers. However, these analyses tend to omit or undervalue the
advantages the Act accords unions and to emphasize the advantages accorded employers. See, e.g.,
Getman, supra note 142, at 578–84.
158. Others, a rare minority by our account of the current state of this relevant scholarship, have
suggested that systemic factors potentially account for a greater percentage of variation in win rates
and union density than do the other factors described above. See Ferguson, supra note 77, at 18; Chris
Riddell, Union Certification Success Under Voting Versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence from
British Columbia, 1978–1998, 57 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 493, 495 (2004).
159. Note well that all of this can be done without engaging in, for example, threats, interrogation,
or recording campaign activity—tactics that neither management nor the union can employ. See supra
notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
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their desires are subordinated to the desires of two large entities each
claiming to care about employee well-being more than the other:
Management swears that it learned a lesson from the experience and
vows to change, while the union swears that no change management
might implement would remain intact without the perpetual threat of
organization attainable only by certifying the union as the employees’
160
representative.
C. Card-Check Neutrality Agreements and the Employee Free
Choice Act
Perhaps the most discussed means of reforming the broken,
outdated means of selecting workplace labor organization representation
is card-check neutrality. This was most recently embodied, in part, in the
161
proposed Employee Free Choice Act. The logic behind EFCA focuses
(incorrectly in our view) on results, not process, and in the end, would
attenuate perhaps the most critical component of the process’s fairness—
employees’ right to freely choose their representative or to choose not to
be represented at all. With respect to neutrality agreements, five
questions must be addressed: (1) what are they, (2) what effect do they
have on unionization, (3) why do employers sign them, (4) what is their
legal status, and (5) do they result in a fair system under our newly
described criteria. We address the first four questions in this Part, and
the fairness question in Part IV.
1. What Are Neutrality Agreements?
Although neutrality agreements come in several forms, the common
denominator for all of them is that employers agree to remain neutral
162
with regard to the union’s attempt to organize the workforce. Some
agreements simply state that the employer will remain neutral but
contain no specific provisions, while other agreements are more
163
detailed. For example, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees

160. Levitt, supra note 96, at 89.
161. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Congress (2009). As discussed above, EFCA
provides for recognition based on card checks, see supra text accompanying notes 17–18, but does not
require employer neutrality.
162. While most agreements contain a definition of neutrality, the definitions vary widely. Most
Communication Workers of America, United Auto Workers, and United Steelworkers of America
agreements define neutrality as “neither helping nor hindering” the union’s organizing effort, yet still
allow employers to communicate facts to the employees. See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union
Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 42, 47 (2001). A
different approach is apparent from the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union agreements that
prohibit the employer from communicating any opposition to the union. Id. Less typical definitions
provide that management will make an affirmative statement to their employees that it welcomes their
choice of a representative. Id.
163. Agreements may state that the employer will not attack or demean the union; the employer
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Union agreements stated that employers would not “communicate
164
opposition” to the union’s efforts.
Neutrality agreements commonly give the union access to
employees in the form of a list of their names and addresses (and,
sometimes, telephone numbers), as well as permission to come onto
company property during work hours for the purpose of collecting
165
authorization cards. This differs from the guidelines established by the
NLRB and the courts, under which an employer has no obligation to
provide the union with such sweeping access to its employees, and may
166
actually be prohibited from doing so.
Finally, most neutrality agreements include a “card check”
provision, which requires the employer to recognize the union if a
167
majority of the bargaining-unit employees sign authorization cards.
Under a card-check agreement, the employees do not vote for the union
168
in a secret-ballot election monitored by the NLRB. Instead, the
employer recognizes the union if it presents the company with the
requisite number of signed authorization cards, at which point the
169
neutrality agreement is no longer needed and expires.
2. What Effect Do Neutrality Agreements Have on Unionization?
Neutrality agreements radically change the landscape of union
organizing. With the aid of such agreements, unions in one study
prevailed in 78% of the situations in which they attempted to organize,
170
compared to only a 46% success rate in contested elections. The
difference between 46% and 78% actually understates the effect of the
neutrality agreement, in part because the sampled populations for the
two figures are different. Elections only occur when the union can show
171
that 30% of the employees have signed authorization cards. As stated
above, however, in almost every situation where a union goes to election,

will not refer to the union as a third party; the parties will strive to create a campaign free of fear,
hostility, and coercion; the parties will campaign in a positive manner; the parties will keep their
statements pro-company or pro-union; and the employer will not state that it is corporate policy to
avoid unionization. See id.
164. Id.
165. Arch Stokes, Robert L. Murphy, Paul E. Wagner & David S. Sherwyn, Neutrality Agreements:
How Unions Organize New Hotels Without an Employee Ballot, Cornell Hotel & Rest. Admin. Q.,
Oct.–Nov. 2001, at 86, 89.
166. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 534 (1992).
167. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 162, at 47 tbl.1 (finding that 73% of neutrality agreements
studied had card-check language).
168. Stokes et al., supra note 165, at 86.
169. Id.
170. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 162, at 52 & tbl.3; see also Riddell, supra note 158, at 509
(finding a union success-rate difference of approximately 19% in British Columbia attributable to
card-check procedures as compared to mandatory-voting procedures).
171. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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it has more than 50% of the employees sign cards. Thus, the sampled
population in the 46% win figure includes only companies where it is
likely that at least 60% of the employees signed cards. Companies where
the union could not get at least 51% of the employees to sign cards did
not go to election and never became part of that figure. Conversely, the
sampled population in the neutrality side of the study includes all
employers who signed such agreements. Those employers whose
employees had no interest represent the 22% of companies that remained
nonunion. In other words, it is likely that 100% of the companies that
went to election would have been unionized under a neutrality with card
check, and the 22% of those under card-check agreements would never
have gone to election. The net effect is quite simple. Assuming there is
enough employee interest to warrant an election in the first place, the
company’s chances of becoming unionized are less than 50% under the
NLRB’s election procedures and nearly guaranteed under a neutrality
agreement with a card-check provision.
It follows that employers wishing to remain nonunion or to give
their employees an opportunity to exercise their right to choose their
elected representative by secret ballot should refuse to sign a neutrality
agreement. This begs the question of why an employer would ever
accede to a neutrality agreement.
3. Why Do Employers Sign Neutrality Agreements?
The question “why do employers sign neutrality agreements?” is
perplexing to the casual observer. The answer is fairly simple. Employers
sign neutrality agreements because they have to or because it makes
business sense. There are two reasons why employers have to sign
neutrality agreements. First, local governments may require neutrality
agreements. For example, San Francisco enacted a labor-peace
ordinance that required neutrality to get a building permit or to do
173
business at the airport or other city-owned property. Other cities have
174
had similar such requirements. Historically, there has been little public
opposition to such requirements and even fewer legal challenges.
Second, employers who are parties to certain collective-bargaining
agreements must agree to a neutrality agreement. For example, the
collective-bargaining agreements covering the hotel employers’
associations in New York City and Chicago contain neutrality
175
agreements. Because the major brands and operators are all parties to

172. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
173. See Michael Reich et al., Inst. Indus. Rel., Living Wages and Economic Performance:
The San Francisco Airport Model, at 7 (2003).
174. For example, there is a similar ordinance in Los Angeles County. See L.A. Cnty., Cal.,
Admin. Code § 2.201.050 (2011).
175. These agreements are on file with the Authors.
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these agreements, any new owner who wishes to use an established
operator or brand must agree to neutrality.
Of course, the next question is why the brands and operators agreed
to neutrality. While it is difficult to state with authority why employers
agreed to something so long ago, one can make some logical
assumptions. Neutrality is a huge gain for the union, and unions should
and do give up other demands in exchange for neutrality. An owner who
does not plan on owning another hotel has no disincentive and, in fact,
has an incentive to force the other brands and operators to sign
neutrality agreements. During negotiations, the union’s willingness to
trade wage increases, for example, for neutrality has an immediate
positive effect on current owners. In addition, it has a long-term positive
effect. Now, if a brand opens a competing hotel, the unionized owner
knows the new hotel likely will be union and, thus, the playing field will
176
be level.
Other times, neutrality simply makes business sense. For example,
SBC Communications, a telephone company, and the Communications
Workers of America entered into an agreement in which the parties
executed neutrality agreements that included card checks for all current
SBC employees and those employed by all firms acquired by SBC in the
177
future. SBC accepted the neutrality agreement in exchange for the
union’s promise to lobby on the company’s behalf regarding antitrust
complications arising out of present and future mergers and
178
acquisitions. Put simply, the company was willing, for all intents and
purposes, to accept that all of its present and future employees would
have one union as their exclusive representative in exchange for the
union’s lobbying assistance. While it may have been a good deal for the

176. See Morris A. Horowitz, The New York Hotel Industry: A Labor Relations Study 30
(1960) (“It was unquestionably becoming clear to the Hotel Association [of New York City], at this
point, that with the growing strength of the unions, it was only a matter of time before a significant
number of hotels would settle with any of the various unions in the field. If this happened, different
hotels would deal with different unions on different terms, and . . . it would be most impractical to
have different wage scales among competitive hotels. . . . [A] uniform union structure in all the hotels
would be economically advantageous to the hotels . . . .”).
177. Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 163, at 44; Harry C. Katz et al., The Revitalization of the CWA:
Integrating Collective Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 573,
586–87 (2003).
178. Katz et al., supra note 177, at 587; see also Interview with Harry C. Katz, Dean and Professor
of Collective Bargaining, Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Lab. Rel., in Ithaca, N.Y. (July 23, 2001);
CWA Tells FCC: Bell Atlantic-GTE, SBC-Ameritech Mergers Will Boost Competition and Benefit All
Consumers, Comm. Workers of Am. (Dec. 13, 1998), http://www.cwa-union.org/news/entry/
cwa_tells_fcc_bell_atlantic-gte_sbc-ameritech_mergers_will_boost_competitio (illustrating the antitrust
lobbying the CWA performed on behalf of SBC); Justice Dept. Approves SBC-Ameritech Deal, Comm.
Workers of Am. (Apr. 1, 1999), http://www.cwa-union.org/news/entry/justice_dept._approves_sbcameritech_deal (same).
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employer, and it certainly was a great deal for the union, the employees
were deprived of information and choice.
4. What Is the Legal Status of Neutrality Agreements?
In assessing the legality of neutrality one needs to distinguish
between that required by government and that entered into by private
employers. The former may be unlawful; the latter is not.
a.

Government-Mandated Neutrality

The legality of government-mandated neutrality suffered its first
serious blow in 2001 when Judge Vaughn Walker of the District Court
for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction
that prevented the San Francisco International Airport from enforcing
its labor-peace and card-check rules against an employer who operated
179
at the airport. The court held that the airport’s labor-peace rule was
unenforceable because it likely conflicted with the so-called preemption
180
principle of the NLRA, which prohibits state and local regulation of
activities that the NLRA “protects, prohibits, or arguably protects or
181
prohibits.” Accordingly, a city, state, or local statute, regulation, or
ordinance that conflicts or interferes with the disposition of issues under
182
the NLRA is unenforceable.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Brown, handed down
by the Supreme Court in 2008, further calls the legality of government183
mandated neutrality into serious doubt. In Brown, the Court struck
down a California statute that prohibited employers who did business
with the state from using state funds to “assist, promote, or deter union
184
organizing.” Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7–2 majority that
reversed the en banc Ninth Circuit, held that the NLRA preempted the
state statute, relying on a different but related preemption doctrine from
185
that relied on by Judge Walker. According to the Court, the Labor
186
Management Relations Act (the “Taft-Hartley Act”), a law passed to
level the playing field of the pro-union NLRA, manifested a
“congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor

179. Aeroground, Inc. v. City of S.F., 170 F. Supp. 2d 950, 959 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
180. Id. at 955–56 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).
181. Wis. Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 286 (1986).
182. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244–45 (1959).
183. 554 U.S. 60, 74 (2008).
184. Id. at 71–74 (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 16645.1–.8 (2010)).
185. Id. at 76; Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132,
150–51 (1976) (“[A] regulation by the state is impermissible because it ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (quoting Hill v.
Florida, 324 U.S. 538, 542 (1945))).
186. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“Taft-Hartley Act”), Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2010)).
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and management.”
The Court found both explicit and implicit
congressional intent to leave noncoercive employer speech unregulated
because it is impermissible to “chill[] one side of ‘the robust debate
188
which has been protected under the NLRA.’”
Although labor-peace statutes differ in some respects from the
189
statute at issue in Brown, they raise many of the same concerns. The
statutes deny employees the “implie[d] . . . underlying right” to
information opposing unionization and discourage free debate of labor190
management issues by stifling one side of the dialogue. Labor-peace
statutes thus embody state policies on organizing—policies that “stand[]
as an obstacle” to the policy Congress pronounced on that issue in the
191
Taft-Hartley Act.
Even more on point is Judge Richard Posner’s decision in
Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce v. Milwaukee
192
County. In Metropolitan Milwaukee, the Seventh Circuit struck down a
Milwaukee ordinance that required certain transportation contractors to
negotiate neutrality agreements as a condition to receiving payment from
193
the county. The ordinance required that these agreements include
clauses subjecting labor disputes to binding arbitration, prohibiting
employers from holding captive-audience speeches and expressing “false
or misleading” information intended to influence an employee’s vote,
and requiring the employer to provide the union with an employee
194
contact list and “timely and reasonable access” to the workplace. The
court held that a state may regulate labor relations with its contractors
only for limited purposes, such as increasing the quality or reducing the
195
cost of the services performed. However, a state may not regulate labor
relations to promote a policy it views as superior to that embodied in the
196
NLRA.
187. Brown, 554 U.S. at 67 (quoting Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 1114, 383
U.S. 53, 62 (1966)).
188. Id. at 73 (quoting Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 275 (1974)); see also Healthcare Ass’n. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 388 F. Supp. 2d 6, 25
(N.D.N.Y. 2005) (striking down, as preempted by the NLRA, N.Y. Lab. L. § 211-a (McKinney 2004),
which prohibited use of state funds to “encourage or discourage union organization”), rev’d, 471 F.3d
87, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (reversing grant of summary judgment based on the presence of fact issues, but
accepting the lower court’s determination that the NLRA might preempt the New York statute).
189. For example, the statute at issue in Brown arguably was even more pro-union in that it
permitted the use of funds toward expenses in connection with allowing union representatives access
to the employer’s premises or “[n]egotiating, entering into, or carrying out a voluntary recognition
agreement.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 16647 (2010).
190. 554 U.S. at 68.
191. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 150 (quoting Hill v. Florida, 324 U.S. 538, 542 (1945)).
192. 431 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 2005).
193. Id. at 277–78.
194. Cnty. of Milwaukee, Wis., Code Gen. Ordinances § 31.02(f) (2000).
195. Metro. Milwaukee, 431 F.3d at 277–78.
196. Id. at 278–79. The county argued in the alternative that the scheme was not regulation, but
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Private Neutrality Agreements

There are three arguments why private neutrality agreements
violate the law: (1) section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act makes it unlawful
for an employer to give or agree to give a “thing of value” to any labor
organization and for a labor organization to receive a thing of value from
197
any employer, (2) the Taft-Hartley Act allows employers the right to
198
campaign against the union, and (3) the NLRA prohibits so-called
199
“company unions.” Below we first describe why a private neutrality
agreement violates the law. We then describe how the courts and the
NLRB have ruled on these issues.
The first question is whether a neutrality agreement itself
constitutes a thing of value provided to a labor organization. Courts use a
seemingly broad interpretation of “thing of value” in section 302. For
instance, in United States v. Schiffman, the question before the court was
whether the request for a reduced room rate constituted a thing of value
200
and thus violated section 302. In that case, a union official who
represented a bargaining unit at a Hyatt property in Florida requested
that an Atlanta Hyatt provide the official with a room rate that was
201
almost 50% less than Hyatt’s corporate rate. The court found that the
room-rate reduction was a thing of value and that the requested favor
202
violated section 302. Similarly, in United States v. Boffa, the court
found that an employer unlawfully provided a thing of value when it
provided a union official with the use of a 1975 Lincoln Continental
203
without charge for a four-month period. This broad definition of “thing
of value” in section 302 is consistent with the judicial interpretation of
204
the same term when it is found in other statutes. Those holdings suggest
allocation of state funds. However, the court held that express regulation versus the use of the county’s
spending power was “a distinction without a difference.” Id. at 279 (quoting Wis. Dep’t of Indus.,
Labor, & Human Relations. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986)).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2010).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2010).
199. Id. § 158(a)(2).
200. 552 F.2d 1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1977).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 688 F.2d 919, 924, 936 (3d Cir. 1982).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 641,
which prohibits embezzling, stealing, purloining, or knowingly converting “any record, voucher,
money, or thing of value” of the U.S. or of any department of agency thereof, includes actions
involving “intangible” property). Other federal statutes use the phrase “anything of value.” See
18 U.S.C. § 201 (2010) (defining criminal bribery and prohibiting any person from giving or attempting
to give “anything of value” to a government official with the intention of influencing their official
actions and reciprocally prohibiting any public official from receiving or attempting to solicit anything
of value in return for official action); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2010) (imposing criminal sanctions for soliciting
or demanding corruptly for the benefit of any person, or accepting or agreeing to accept “anything of
value” from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business,
transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of
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that a similarly broad interpretation would apply to a thing of value
under section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Neutrality agreements almost always require the employer to
provide at least four things that have been or logically would be
characterized by the courts as things of value under this broad definition
of the term: access to the hotel’s premises so the union can speak to the
employees, a list of employees, a card-check provision, and exclusivity to
one union. If any of those are benefits that constitute a thing of value, the
typical neutrality agreement would violate section 302 of the TaftHartley Act. Indeed, it seems clear that these four items are things of
value. As explained above, the value of the card check is significant: it
substantially increases the likelihood of union success in an organizing
205
Similarly, access to employees, directories, and exclusive
drive.
206
dealings are not required by the law and seemingly would help the
union in its efforts. One would presume that significant help in
organizing an employer—the main goal of the union—would constitute a
207
thing of value.
The second argument that private neutrality agreements violate the
law stems from section 7 of the NLRA, which grants employees the right
208
to organize or to refrain from organizing. The right to refrain from
209
organizing was added to the NLRA in the Taft-Hartley Act. To
operationalize this right, Taft-Hartley allows employers and employees
to file unfair-labor-practice charges against unions when the unions’
210
conduct interferes with the section 7 rights of employees, and gives
employers the right to exercise free speech with regard to union
organizing as long as they do not threaten, make promises to, interrogate,
211
confer benefits on, or solicit grievances from employees. It seems that
the purpose of these free-speech guarantees is to allow employees access
value of $5,000 or more).
205. See supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
206. Exclusive dealing means that only the union that was a party to the agreement, and not rival
unions, would have access and directories.
207. See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text.
208. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2010) (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . .”).
209. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80-101, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 140 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157).
210. Id. § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2010). Prior to Taft-Hartley, unfair-labor-practice claims could
be filed only against employers. See Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 8, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935).
211. Uarco, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. 1, 1–2 (1974) (holding that it is not the solicitation of grievances
itself that is coercive and violative of section 8(a)(1), but the promise to correct grievances, and that
solicitation of grievances raises a rebuttable inference that the employer is making such a promise);
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (“[A]n employer’s free speech right to
communicate his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union or the
Board.”).
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to information so that they can be fully informed before deciding
whether to organize or to refrain from organizing. Consequently, an
employer’s decision to remain neutral seems to deprive employees of
access to information critical of the union and thereby may interfere with
employees’ right to refrain from unionizing.
Finally, private neutrality agreements may violate section 8(a)(2) of
the NLRA, which prohibits employers from assisting unions by giving
them financial or other support, a provision that eliminated the so-called
212
company unions of days past. Like the employers’ right to engage in
free speech, the purpose of section 8(a)(2) is to preserve the free exercise
of employees’ section 7 rights. Because collusion between an employer
and a union can detrimentally affect employees by interfering with their
rights to refrain from organizing, it would seem that a neutrality
agreement violates section 8(a)(2).
While there is no case on point, the NLRB’s analysis of section
8(a)(2) supports this argument. In reviewing alleged 8(a)(2) violations,
the NLRB has noted the Supreme Court’s direction that courts need to
carefully scrutinize “all factors, often subtle, which restrain an
employee’s choice and for which the employer may be said to be
213
responsible.” Under this totality-of-the-circumstances test, the NLRB
has found that the following factors may constitute evidence of a
violation of section 8(a)(2): the employer’s introducing the union to its
employees, the employer’s permitting the union to solicit employees to
sign cards on the employer’s property and during work hours, the
employer’s extending recognition to a union that had not collected valid
recognition cards, and the employer’s executing a collective-bargaining
agreement before the union had demonstrated that it represented an
214
uncoerced majority of employees. Moreover, the NLRB has found that
“signed cards . . . cannot be considered reliable representation of
employee sentiments when there is evidence of the employer’s assistance
215
to the union.”
While allowing a union the use of company time and property is not
216
a per se violation of section 8(a)(2), that factor in addition to the fact
that the employer has chosen which union it will introduce to its
employees, along with the other neutrality requirements described

212. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2010) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it . . . .”).
213. Windsor Place Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. 445, 448 (1985) (citing Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Lodge No.
35 v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1946)).
214. Windsor Place Corp., 276 N.L.R.B. at 449.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 448 (citing Manuela Mfg. Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 379 (1963)).
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above, compels the conclusion that such agreements violate section
217
8(a)(2).
Despite the above arguments, the NLRB and the federal courts
consistently uphold neutrality agreements. In Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Resources, LLC, the
Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether a neutrality agreement was
218
a “thing of value.” In three short paragraphs devoid of any real
219
analysis, the court rejected the thing-of-value argument. The basis for
this rejection was the court’s interpretation of the purposes of the statute
220
and the effect of neutrality agreements. According to the court, the
prohibition against providing a thing of value was passed “to prevent
employers from tampering with the loyalty of union officials and to
221
prevent union officials from extorting tribute from employers.” This
prohibition, the court continued, is limited to bribery, extortion, and
other corrupt practices conducted in secret and only addresses
222
agreements to pay, loan, or deliver any money or thing of value. The
court then held that a neutrality agreement benefited both parties with
efficiencies and cost savings and did not involve the payment, loan, or
223
delivery of anything.
This analysis is woefully lacking in an understanding of the relevant
case law and of the nature of labor relations. For example, the reduced
hotel room rate in Schiffman was neither bribery, nor extortion, nor
corruption. Moreover, it did not involve the payment, loan, or delivery of
anything. What it did do, rather, was create a situation where the union
official may have felt indebted to the employer, arguably hindering his
ability to fully represent the employees. We dispute that a savings of $20
224
would have such an effect, but the court held it could. On the other
hand, a neutrality agreement granting exclusive collective-bargaining
rights to one union could result in dues of $35 to $50 per month from
thousands of employees. Hundreds of thousands of dollars per month
seems like a thing of value. Would a union, for example, give up its
demands for increases in wages or health and safety measures in
exchange for that kind of money and power? Of course it would. In fact,
that is exactly what UNITE-HERE did in the summer of 2006 when it

217. Moreover, under a neutrality agreement, employers recognize unions based on signatures that
result from employer assistance to the union. Those cards should not be considered reliable and the
NLRB should not certify the union.
218. 390 F.3d 206, 218 (3d Cir. 2004).
219. Id. at 218–19.
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1227 (9th
Cir. 1979)).
222. Id. at 219.
223. Id.
224. United States v. Schiffman, 552 F.2d 1124, 1126 (5th Cir. 1977).
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threatened an industry-wide strike if employers did not agree to
neutrality agreements and reduced demands that would have benefited
the current employees in exchange for the ability to organize nonunion
225
hotels. This seems like what section 302 was designed to prevent. The
226
courts, however, do not agree. In fact, the Fourth Circuit and at least
227
two federal district courts followed Sage Hospitality. In addition, in
Dana Corporation, the NLRB followed Sage Hospitality, holding that
card-check neutrality furthers the NLRA’s purpose of promoting labor
228
peace. In other words, an agreement that is provided at the expense of
current members’ wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment
and that jeopardizes the employees’ section 7 right to refrain from
joining a union is permissible as long as it furthers labor peace.
We believe that card-check neutrality agreements violate section
302 and the NLRA and therefore should not be enforced. Our belief,
however, does not reflect the current state of the law and thus, for the
time being, neutrality agreements are alive and well.
D. Legislative and Adjudicative Initiatives
EFCA would have put part of the section 302 issue to rest because it
would have mandated employers to recognize unions as the exclusive
representative of petitioned-for units of employees on the basis of signed
229
authorization cards from a majority of employees in those units. The
midterm elections destroyed any chance of this statute being passed
during President Obama’s first term. While the passage of EFCA may no
longer be viable, its aftereffects remain on both sides of the table. The
concept of “free choice” ending the process of secret-ballot elections was
an anomaly that not only doomed the statute, but that also resulted in
proposed state legislation that would outlaw card checks. In November
of 2010, voters in four states—Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota,
and Utah—voted to amend their state constitutions to require secret230
ballot elections for union certification. The NLRB has taken the
position that these amendments are preempted by the NLRA and thus

225. Richard W. Hurd, Neutrality Agreements: Innovative, Controversial, and Labor’s Hope for the
Future, New Lab. Forum, Spring 2008, at 35, 36–37; David Sherwyn, Zev J. Eigen & Paul Wagner, The
Hotel Industry’s Summer of 2006: A Watershed Moment for America’s Labor Unions?, 47 Cornell
Hotel & Rest. Admin. Q. 337, 343–45 (2006).
226. See Adcock v. Freightliner, LLC, 550 F.3d 369, 376 (4th Cir. 2008).
227. See United Steel Workers Int’l Union v. Hibbing Joint Venture, No. 06-4820, 2007 WL
2580546, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Sept. 4, 2007); Patterson v. Heartland Indus. Partners, LLP, 428 F. Supp.
2d 714, 724 (N.D. Ohio 2006).
228. 356 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 2010-2011 NLRB Dec. ¶ 15,369 (Dec. 6, 2010).
229. S. 560, 111th Cong., § 2(a)(6) (2009).
230. Ariz. Const. art. II, § 37; S.C. Const. art. II, § 12; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 28; Utah Const.
art. IV, § 8(1).
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231

are unenforceable. These issues will be played out before the NLRB
232
and ultimately the courts. In addition, as stated above, numerous states
233
are discussing right-to-work legislation. Currently there are twenty234
three right-to-work states.
On the other side of the ledger, organized labor is lobbying the
NLRB to change its rules and shorten the time between the filing of the
petition and the election. Commentators are proposing a time period of
twenty, ten, or even five days between the filing of the petition and the
235
election. Labor argues that a shortened time period would allow a
secret-ballot election but would curtail management’s ability to threaten,
236
intimidate, coerce, promise benefits to, and surveil employees.
There are two problems with a shortened-election scheme. First,
assuming that a fully informed electorate is desirable, five or ten days
simply is not enough time for management to convey its side of the story.
Unfortunately, this is a trade-off between interests that likely cannot be
reconciled. The second problem, however, hurts both sides. Before
holding a union election, several issues must be resolved, the most
difficult one being the scope of the bargaining unit. Those advocating for
quick elections argue that a “vote now and litigate later” approach will
237
sufficiently address these issues. This play on the classic collectivebargaining mantra, “work now and grieve later,” will not work.
Currently, management decides whether to contest the bargaining unit
238
before the election. While delay can help management in the election,
employers often consent to the proposed unit to avoid the expense of
challenging the proposal, the risk of losing the challenge, and the
231. State Constitutional Amendments Conflict with the NLRA, NLRB (Jan. 14, 2011),
http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/statesfactsheet.pdf.
232. See Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Tom Horne, Ariz. Att’y Gen.
(Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_az.pdf (threatening
litigation); Letter from Lafe E. Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Alan Wilson, S.C. Att’y Gen. (Jan.
13, 2011), available at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_sc.pdf (same); Letter from
Lafe E. Solomon, Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Marty J. Jackley, S.D. Att’y Gen. (Jan. 13, 2011), available
at http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_sd.pdf (same); Letter from Lafe E. Solomon,
Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Att’y Gen. (Jan. 13, 2011), available at
http://nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/234/letter_ut.pdf (same).
233. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
235. See 155 Cong. Rec. S3, 636 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 2009) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter)
(proposing a quick-election scheme where the initial election would be held within twenty-one days of
the filing of the petition); Implications of the Employee Free Choice Act, Metro. Corp. Counsel, Sept.
2009, at 12.
236. The NLRB held a hearing on June 18 and 19 to discuss shortening the elections, where
professionals and academics opined on the topic. See Open Meeting on Proposed Election Process
Rules, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/openmeeting (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
237. See Proposed Election Rule Changes, Hearing Before the NLRB 358 (July 19, 2011), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/documents/525/publicmeeting07-19-11-corrected.pdf (statement of
union-side attorney Joe Paller).
238. See Stokes et al., supra note 165, at 88.
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potential of appearing obstructionist to employees. In contrast, if “vote
now and litigate later” were the norm, once management lost, they
would have every incentive to litigate. Management lawyers invoking the
need for discovery, briefs, open hearing dates, and other litigation
instruments could delay certification for months or even years. In effect,
“vote now and litigate later” would provide employers with a legitimate
excuse to tie up union victories in litigation for years, while under the
current scheme employers lose credibility if they engage in such dilatory
tactics.

IV. Developing a New System for Union Organizing
As stated above, we contend that a fair system would be one in
which employees have full information (or as full of an opportunity to
obtain complete information as possible) and feel that during the process
they were treated with respect and not threatened or intimidated by
either side. The current status quo, neutrality agreements, card checks
(with or without neutrality), and quick elections all fail to meet our
standard. Under current NLRB rules, the sides can lie to each other,
employees report being fired and intimidated, and each side uses its
respective weapons to defeat the other. Neutrality and quick elections
axiomatically expose employees to only one side of the story, and card
239
check is subject to intimidation by unions.
It is our belief that some approach the conversation about how to
improve the collective labor-representation election system with the
preexisting belief that employees should be represented by a union
(because that is what is in their best interest, whether employees realize
it or not), and some approach the conversation with the view that
employees should not be represented by unions (whether employees
realize that it is in their best interest or not). Hence, some of the focus is
on developing reform that tilts results in one direction or the other. For
instance, the normative debate about neutrality reveals much of this
paternalistic orientation. Some are willing to sacrifice what we believe to
be one of the core tenets of democracy and workplace governance—
namely employees’ right to vote for their representative, or vote not to
be represented at all—in the name of increasing union win rates, because
of the belief that higher union density is better for everyone, including
employers and employees, both represented and nonrepresented.
Our mantra is that a system for electing labor organizations needs to
be focused on what is best for voting employees, deferring to them to

239. Some union advocates laugh at the concept of union intimidation. But union organizers make
a name for themselves and remain employed if they are successful. It is naïve to assert that a union
organizer two cards away from victory would not be more likely to resort to intimidation or other less
than desirous means to secure success.
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make the decisions that directly affect them before worrying about what
is good for the U.S. economy or other employees across town. We
therefore endeavored to find or develop a system that would
operationalize our core beliefs, which are summarized as follows:
(1) unionization will benefit some employees, but will not benefit others;
(2) some employees want a union and others do not; (3) employee
choice, rather than achieving labor peace regardless of the cost, should
drive policy; (4) employees should have full information, or at least the
maximum opportunity for exposure to full information; (5) employees
should vote in a secret-ballot election; (6) management and unions have
corrupted the current NLRA rules so that the goal is to win and not to
facilitate employee choice; and (7) a union organizing system will be
successful if, regardless of the result, at its conclusion the employees feel
they have been respected, fully informed, not intimidated, and are
satisfied that they made the choice they wanted to make.
A. The Principles for Ethical Conduct During Union
Representational Campaigns
Before developing our own system, we looked to find a proposal or
practice that satisfied our goals. There is one. We encourage unions,
management, and ultimately Congress to adopt the Principles for Ethical
Conduct During Union Representational Campaigns (the “Principles”)
240
developed by the Institute for Employee Choice. However, we raise
some significant questions about the way in which the Principles should
be implemented. These questions carry important consequences, more
broadly than in the labor-management relations context, about the
differences between positivistic legal rules and normative, sociomoral,
self-imposed constraints as optimal means of enforcement regimes.
The Institute for Employee Choice is the brainchild of Richard
Bensinger and Dick Shubert. Bensinger is a long-time union organizer
whose resume includes being the first head of organizing for the AFLCIO, as well as working with UNITE-HERE, the United Auto Workers
241
(“UAW”), and other unions. Shubert is the former CEO of Bethlehem
Steel and former Deputy Secretary of Labor under the Nixon and Ford
242
administrations. Both men grew frustrated by the current system and
243
its perverse incentives for both unions and management. Despite
coming from opposite sides of a polarized issue, Bensinger and Shubert

240. Richard Bensinger & Dick Shubert, Inst. for Emp. Choice, Principles for Ethical Conduct
During Union Representational Campaigns (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Authors).
241. Institute Directors, Inst. for Emp. Choice, http://www.employeechoice.org (select “About
Us”) (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
242. Id.
243. Richard Bensinger, Co-Chair, Inst. for Emp. Choice, Lecture at Cornell University (Feb. 13,
2012).
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share the core beliefs listed above. Their experiences and their beliefs
led them to create an institute grounded on two principles: to do what is
245
best for employees and to be governed by ethics—not law.
The Ethical Principles are as follows:
These principles define ethical conduct for both unions and
employers and are based on the premise that employees will make the
decision about organizing through a contested secret ballot election.
(1): Truthfulness. The Employer and the Union should be truthful and
accurate in their campaigns. Although the law does not regulate
honesty, the parties have the ethical obligation to present accurate
information to employees. If either side contends that a statement by
the other is not accurate and truthful, the Institute for Employee
Choice, a joint labor/management entity, will provide an opinion.
(2): No threats, implicit or explicit. Neither the Union nor the
Employer should make threats, implicit or explicit, in order to gain
votes. A free choice requires that there be no coercion or fear. Under
current law, veiled threats are tolerated and there are no meaningful
penalties for direct threats. An atmosphere of fear is antithetical to
free expression of employee choice.
(3): No promises. Just as threats are not acceptable, neither are
promises or bribes. Under the NLRA employers are prohibited but
unions are allowed to make promises. Under these principles unions
are also forbidden to make promises to gain votes.
(4): It is not fair to imply that the exception is the rule. A common way
of distorting the truth is by presenting an unusual situation, and
implying that this is the norm. The parties must not use extreme
examples to sway opinion. And also should tell the whole story.
(5): Corporate campaigns. If employers agree to these principles, then
unions should not undertake “corporate campaign” strategies designed
to pressure the employer. These principles presume that both parties
reach out to employees to present their case. Corporate campaigns are
only ethical when there is an uneven playing field such that employee
free choice is not meaningfully present.
(6): Discharges. There should be no discharges, subcontracting of
work, or layoffs aimed at discouraging union activity. This is the
ultimate coercion, and immediately chills any possible free choice.
Employers who terminate a known union supporter or member of the
union’s organizing committee should submit the termination to
immediate arbitration. Penalties for discharging a union supporter
should include quadruple back pay as well as punitive damages to
discourage such conduct. The reason that multiple backpay and
reinstatement is not a sufficient deterrent is because this behavior has
such a drastic chilling [e]ffect on the rest of the workforce. Punitive
damages as appropriate are essential to deter such conduct.

244. Id.
245. Id.
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(7): Equal time, equal access, equal posting rights and all meetings are
voluntary. The union must have equal access to the electorate
including equal time for all meetings conducted as part of the
employer’s campaign. A series of debates between management and
the union is encouraged. The employees should have a right to hear
both sides, without any advantage to either side. There should be no
one on one meetings about the union between supervisors and
employees. The union must be granted equal space to post literature
on company property.
(8): Delays. The employer should agree not to engage in delaying
tactics. Parties cannot ethically rely on lengthy legal maneuvers to
thwart freedom of choice.
(9): No pressure to sign union cards. The union should not pressure
employees to sign cards. Peer pressure or coercion to get people to sign
union cards is not ethical.
(10): Respect. Neither party should demonize its adversary. An
atmosphere of mutual respect is necessary for an ethical climate.
Unions have an important role in a democracy. Employers also are
entitled to be respected. Neither party should engage in smear tactics.
(11): Stacking the deck. Neither party should attempt to “stack the
deck.” If employers accept these principles, then the union may not
ethically plant undercover union-supporters (salts) into the workplace.
Neither can employers seek to hire anti-union personnel in order to
gain votes.
(12): The final principle is not a specific ethical guideline, but the
Golden Rule—do unto others as you would have them do to unto you.
Both employers and unions have an important role to play in a vibrant
democracy, and ethical behavior is an end in itself. The Institute for
Employee Choice is available to support and commend employers and
246
unions who agree to adhere to these principles

The substance of the Principles appeals to us for a number of
reasons. The obvious reasons are that they provide for elections, full
information, and truthfulness, and they prohibit coercion and
intimidation. More important, they address the more subtle issues. The
NLRA prohibits explicit threats, but any good management lawyer can
247
make sure that the company’s implicit threats are lawfully conveyed. In
addition, we support the Principles because they have one set of rules for
both sides. Employees will get equal access to both sides and neither side
will be able to exploit the rules to gain an advantage. While employers
may bristle at inviting the union onto the premises, the elimination of

246. Bensinger & Shubert, supra note 240.
247. For example, compare what an employer cannot lawfully tell its employees (“If you vote for
the union there will eventually be a strike, and there will be no wages, no health insurance, and
strikers can lose their jobs when the strike is over”) with what employers may lawfully tell employees,
(“We will bargain in good faith, but will not agree to unreasonable union demands. If the union does
not accept our offer its only choice will be to call a strike. The company hopes this does not happen,
but if it does, there will be no wages, no health insurance, and strikers can lose their jobs when the
strike is over. We hope this does not happen, but it’s a real concern if you vote for the union.”).
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corporate campaigns, which are driven by union intimidation and
management’s fear of the loss of business, should make an acceptable
trade.
In addition to satisfying our goals, the Principles are attractive
because they may soon be operationalized. While the Institute has held
only one election, the UAW recently announced a plan to operate under
248
The UAW is currently in
the Principles for all new elections.
negotiations with the major multinational car manufacturers to make the
249
Principles the method for all future elections.
Anecdotal evidence from the one past election showed that the
employees who voted did, in fact, believe that they had full information
250
to make a choice free from intimidation. The fact that these Principles
may be used allows us to make a call for future research. We propose a
commissioned study where researchers survey employees who have gone
through organizing under the NLRA procedures, neutrality, and the
Principles to determine if any system truly satisfies the goals outlined
above.
There are, of course, some issues that need to be addressed. The
Principles prohibit one-on-one supervisor-employee conversations but
do not address union organizers doing the same. We would allow
supervisor conversations as long as they otherwise complied with the
Principles. We would also allow union organizers to have similar
conversations on an employer’s property. After the petition is filed, we
would prohibit off-site campaigning by either side.
B. Enacting the Principles
Finally, perhaps the most interesting issue at the heart of this Article
is determining the optimal way to maximize the enforceability of the
Principles. There are three possible approaches: (1) codify the Principles
statutorily and impose legal sanctions for violations, (2) codify the
Principles as an optional component part of the law, and provide
incentives for unions and employers to agree to them and to comply, or
(3) leave the Principles out of the law books, keeping their authority and
enforceability entirely derived from extralegal sources. We address each
of these options below.
Codifying the Principles into law with legal sanctions in place for
noncompliance seems like the mechanism least likely to yield the desired
results. This mechanism most closely resembles the current scheme of the
248. UAW Principles for Fair Union Elections, UAW (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.uaw.org/articles/
uaw-principles-fair-union-elections; see Joan Silvi, Answering UAW’s Call: Doing the Right Thing,
Solidarity Mag. (Jan.–Feb. 2011), http://www.uaw.org/story/answering-uaw’s-call.
249. Paul Ingrassia, The United Auto Workers Test Drive a New Model, Wall St. J. Online (Feb.
6, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704709304576123822184484398.html.
250. Telephone Interview with Richard Bensinger, Co-Chair, Inst. for Emp. Choice (Feb. 7, 2011).
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NLRA; implementing the Principles this way would do little more than
reform a law plagued by inefficient system gaming by piling on more law
ready to be equally inefficient and gamed by management and unions
seeking to win. As they have done for decades under existing statutory
regulation, unions and employers would have their lawyers opine on
optimal ways of subverting and circumventing the rules, testing statutory
language for interpretive weaknesses (for example, what is a “delay
tactic” under the eighth principle—what if something has the effect of
causing delay, but is done for some ulterior purpose?). The assumption
some could make is that the cost of the sanction to the violator,
discounted by the likelihood of being found in violation, is less than or
equal to the administrative costs of investigation plus the costs of
imposing those sanctions. These costs could be weighed against the
benefits of circumventing the Principles. The probability that more
employers and unions would make this calculus their primary means of
determining whether to adhere to the Principles, and would engage in
strategizing ways to subvert the Principles, would be greater under this
implementation because neither unions nor employers would have any
choice in agreeing to the terms. The contractual element of the Principles
would be stripped away.
There is substantial theory and some empirical evidence to support
the argument we make here that entering into contracts (with the same
terms) might make unions and employers more likely to feel bound by
the terms of the agreement and to conceive of their obligations to
perform the terms of the agreement out of moral or social/normative
251
constraints instead of doing the cost-benefit calculus alone. We submit
that enacting into law what really amounts to a moral obligation to “do
the right thing” in union campaigns tethered with sanctions penalizing
violations is likely to be as effective as music producers relying on
intellectual property rights protection laws to police music pirating. The
lessons learned from the Recording Industry Association of America’s
difficulties fighting digital music piracy suggest that when moral
obligations are framed as legal ones, with the threat of a sanction for
252
failure to comply, less effective enforcement is likely to result. In fact, it
may be the case that building a fence (in the form of statutes) prompts
those perceived as fenced out to conceive of ways of jumping over the
fence, and perhaps even implicitly challenges them to do so. The fence

251. Robert J. Bies & Tom R. Tyler, The “Litigation Mentality” in Organizations: A Test of
Alternative Psychological Explanations, 4 Org. Sci. 352, 352 (1993) (identifying different psychological
factors that could explain why employees consider suing their employers); Tyler, supra note 1, at 70–73
(suggesting that individuals comply because of their long-term commitment to membership in a society
rather than because of their short-term self-interests).
252. See Sudip Bhattacharjee et al., Impact of Legal Threats on Online Music Sharing Activity: An
Analysis of Music Industry Legal Actions, 49 J. Law & Econ. 91, 110 (2006).
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shifts the perceived responsibility for the parameters on behavior to
lawmakers and diminishes the moral responsibility for violations of the
spirit of the law.
It seems this is true for treatment of new proposals to amend labor
law that do little more than add more laws. For instance, when President
Obama was elected and EFCA seemed likely to pass, labor-andemployment law firms responded by releasing memoranda to their
clients advising them how to maximize management’s existing goals,
perpetuating the status quo, and how to challenge the law directly and
253
indirectly. Our claim is further bolstered by recent empirical work
demonstrating that a legal threat to enforce a contract purporting to
obligate individuals to perform an undesirable task is slightly less
254
effective than a naked request to perform the same task.
We have a more difficult time adjudicating between the second and
third proposed enforcement mechanisms than we do rejecting the first.
Under the second proposed enforcement regime, employers and labor
organizations would still have existing regulation setting the floor for
their behavior. For the reasons discussed above, this floor is suboptimal.
However, it does enjoy the undeniable advantage of augmented
predictability and certainty. This should not be underestimated. If the
Principles were codified as optionally available, such that both sides had
to jointly register their agreement with the NLRB, creating a public
certification thereof, this would create opportunities for increased
enforcement through administrative channels. This would cost more,
surely. What effect would it have on the parties’ behavior? In part, the
effect likely would be a function of the kinds of incentives offered for
agreement and compliance with the Principles. Two advantages of this
enforcement scheme are incentives to agree to the Principles via a
centralized agency, and casting a wider net to capture more organizing
drives. We propose that the incentive for agreeing to the Principles is
being listed in a publicly available database (that lists all petitions filed)
as having agreed to the Principles. Employers and unions that agreed
would also become eligible for tax incentives and for priority bidding
rights on government contracting. Failing to agree would render an
employer ineligible for such incentives and government contract work,
and the public record would reflect which party or parties refused to sign
the agreement. Parties that fully complied with the Principles (as
determined by a neutral mediator-arbitrator, as described below, in the

253. See, e.g., Robert J. Battista et al., Littler Mendelson, P.C., The Employee Free Choice
Act: A Critical Analysis (2008); Peter D. Conrad et al., Proskauer Rose LLP, The Employee
Free Choice Act: Are You a Target? (2008); The EFCA, Organized Labor’s Legislative Agenda and
Its Impact on Your Business, Fisher & Phillips LLP (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.laborlawyers.com/
shownews.aspx?Show=10884&Type=1122#Threat.
254. Eigen, supra note 4 (manuscript at 9).
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event charges were filed alleging breach, or where no charges were filed
at all) would be listed on the public database as having agreed to and
complied with the Principles. Employers or unions that breached the
agreement would lose their eligibility for tax incentives and government
contract bidding, and would be listed on the public site as having agreed
to the Principles and then failing to comply with them.
The main advantage of this enforcement scheme is the set of options
available to the parties, but this could also be a disadvantage because
parties would self-select into or out of an enforcement regime we might
prefer to see applied to all employers and unions. In some respects, this
sorting could be viewed as a kind of proxy for prioritization for the kinds
of workplaces, employment, and labor organizations that would be able
to benefit. For instance, entertainment-industry guilds like the Writers’
Guild of America, the Screen Actors Guild, and the Directors Guild of
America likely would be in the group that would benefit from this kind
of incentive scheme, but perhaps not so for entertainment-industry
unions that represent “below the line” employees like the Teamsters
(representing transportation and casting directors), the International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, or the National Association of
Broadcast Employees and Technicians. The first category of labor
organizations cares more about its public reputation than does the latter.
However, one way this problem could be ameliorated is by requiring
unions and employers to complete a form when they submit their
response to either agree to be bound by the Principles or not, which
essentially would place them in a supply chain. For instance, if the
Teamsters represent truck drivers of the Acme Truck Company, a
company with a mostly unknown brand name, it might be difficult to
discover where that company is in a supply chain. However, if Acme
delivered coffee to Starbucks, Acme would be more readily discoverable
because of that affiliation, making it and other similarly situated
employers and unions more accountable under our proposed system.
While this enforcement scheme seems better than the first one, it
still might suffer from the moral obligation framed as a legal enforcement
scheme problem identified above. Employers and unions will still see a
cost-benefit analysis as the primary framing of the question of whether to
agree to the Principles in a given election. Nonetheless, in the study cited
above, morally framing a legally valenced contractual obligation sufficiently
255
motivated parties to conform to the agreed-upon obligation. That is,
perhaps it is the moral obligation partially connected to obeying the law,
not just “living up to one’s word,” that makes the effects of a moral
framing of contract enforceability so powerful in the cited experimental

255. Id. at 27.
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study. This conforms with other recent empirical research in this area.
It is therefore unclear whether this enforcement scheme would produce
the benefit of the moral framing’s powerful self-regulating motivation
and the benefit of an instrumental framing’s motivation. It is also unclear
whether this regime is better than the one evaluated next, in which the
moral component of the agreement is made independently from a
codified legal obligation.
The third possible enforcement regime is perhaps the closest to a
pure morally derived authority for enforcement as possible. Under this
regime, the law would remain as it is now, and parties would be allowed
to agree to the Principles on an ad hoc basis. The incentives to agree
would be the same as they are now. This regime likely would result in the
fewest number of total elections governed by the Principles, but perhaps
also the lowest administrative cost of enforcement. The parties who
agreed to the Principles under this regime probably would be the most
likely to feel bound by the terms for moral reasons, or would otherwise
have agreed because they had intended to behave in accordance with the
Principles anyway, or because the employer would not have campaigned
at all if indifferent to its workforce being unionized. Enforcement would
257
be grounded in the same moral basis as some contracts are. This should
not be underestimated. It could be argued that this enforcement regime
would do better than the second one because the moral obligation is
divorced from a legal one. Perhaps where contracts are concerned, the
moral obligation, derivative even from the Bible, to live up to one’s
258
word works in spite of any positivistic power of contract obedience
(that the law requires enforcement of valid contracts). Promise and
259
doctrinal contract have clearly intertwined roots, but there is little
empirical evidence of how parties would interpret a promise like that
embodied in the Principles and even less evidence of whether that
promise would more likely be self-enforced with or without legal basis
and obligation.

256. Feldman & Teichman, supra note 4, at 25–27; Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 4, at 420–
23; Yuval Feldman & Tom Tyler, Mandated Justice: The Potential Promise and Possible Pitfalls of
Mandating Procedural Justice in the Workplace 2 (June 7, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133521.
257. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 17 (1981)
(“An individual is morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a
convention whose function is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised
performance. To renege is to abuse a confidence . . . . [T]o abuse that confidence now is like . . . lying:
the abuse of a shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust.”). But see P.S.
Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 652–59 (1979) (discussing the decline in the
acceptance of a moral basis for contractual obligations).
258. “If a man . . . takes an oath to bind himself . . . he shall not violate his word . . . . ” Numbers
30:2 (New Am. Std.).
259. Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Moral Views of Market Society, 33 Ann. Rev. Soc. 285, 297
(2007).
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In sum, it is difficult to determine whether embedding the Principles
in the law as an optional, incentivized moral contract would result in less
instrumentally minded decisionmaking and more moral-based
decisionmaking than would leaving the Principles entirely outside of the
law as a pure creature of contract. However, given the significant
advantages of casting a wider net with the positive-incentive scheme
identified above, especially the public accountability unavailable in the
260
third regime-implementation option, we espouse the second option
over the third.
C. Enforcing Agreements to Be Bound by the Principles
In this Subpart, we address how we envision disputes over violations
of the Principles being adjudicated and resolved. The NLRB would
assign a mediator to each petitioned bargaining unit in which the parties
agree to the Principles. If either side alleged a violation of the Principles
before the election were held, the mediator would mediate this dispute. If
the parties were unable to resolve their dispute through this process, the
mediator would render a decision that could take one of four forms. The
mediator would be empowered to conduct an arbitration hearing, taking
testimony and evidence in the traditional manner. The mediatorarbitrator then would determine whether the alleged offense violated the
parties’ agreement, and if it did, what remedy to fashion. If the offense
by management was so egregious that it poisoned the chances of
conducting a fair election, the arbitrator might issue a bargaining order.
The bar for such an order should be significantly lower than it is under
current NLRB law. That is, the penalty associated with highly egregious
violations of the Principles should be high. If the offense by the union
was so egregious that it poisoned the chances of conducting a fair
election, the arbitrator might rule that no election was to be held and
that the union was barred from attempting to organize the employees for
up to three years. For nonegregious violations of the Principles by
management or the union, or in the event that employees (not privy to
the agreement itself) were found to have done something that violated
the terms of the agreement, the arbitrator would be empowered to
fashion awards as she deemed necessary to facilitate a fair election
procedure. This might include, but certainly would not be limited to,
requiring management and the union to issue joint statements, or
requiring one or the other to issue unilateral statements that ameliorated
any tainting effects of conduct found to violate the Principles.
After elections were held, the results would be not be released or
publicized in any way for six days. Employers and unions may use this

260. This is because it would be very difficult to ensure that all petitions—even ones in which the
union does not propose agreeing to the Principles—would be tracked.
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time to determine whether any violations of the Principles occurred and
to bring a claim to the mediator. If no claims were lodged, after this time
the results of the election would be released and both sides by default
would have waived their rights to allege any violations of the Principles
or to challenge any of the votes for any reason other than issues relating
to interpreting intentions of voters from their ballots. If charges were
filed during the six-day period, the mediator would mediate the dispute
and, failing successful mediation, arbitrate in the same manner as
described above. Again, the mediator-arbitrator would be empowered to
issue any manner of award, including issuing a bargaining order for
egregious employer violations, or an election bar for up to three years for
egregious union violations.
A mediation/arbitration system like this one is likely to work best
because it offers informality and flexibility, two important qualities of a
dispute-resolution system for resolving claims arising out of a morally
261
valenced contract. More control over the process should beget more
control over the resolution of disputes and should result in more creative
262
integrative solutions than would an adjudicatory process by itself. The
opportunity for greater ownership over the dispute-resolution process
and the ability to exert more influence over the outcomes of disputes
should also be held out as a significant incentive for agreeing to the
Principles.
There are two primary means of evaluating the effectiveness of our
proposed system. First, one would expect to see an increase in the
number of elections held as a percentage of petitions filed where the
Principles are agreed to as compared to instances where the Principles
are not agreed to. This would be a victory in and of itself. Currently, the
rate at which elections are held as a proportion of petitions filed is 65%
263
by one estimate. Whether unions withdraw their petitions because of
newly discovered information, because events that transpire that lead
them to believe that they can no longer win, because the employer
commits unfair labor practices that the union believes render victory
impossible, or because the costs of victory appear too great, we suspect
that where the Principles were agreed to, this rate would go up
significantly. This would be considered a victory under the
conceptualization of fairness advocated herein because more employee
choice would determine the ultimate question of whether employees

261. Roy J. Lewicki & Blair H. Sheppard, Choosing How to Intervene: Factors Affecting the Use of
Process and Outcome Control in Third Party Dispute Resolution, 6 J. Occupational Behav. 49, 63
(1985); see also Ann Douglas, Industrial Peacemaking 3–4 (1962); Richard E. Walton,
Interpersonal Peacemaking: Confrontations and Third-Party Consultation 117–21 (1969).
262. Corinne Bendersky, Organizational Dispute Resolution Systems: A Complementarities Model,
28 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 643, 650–651 (2003).
263. Ferguson, supra note 77, at 6 tbl.1.
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wish to be represented or not than would other considerations such as
union strategy, union expenses, employer strategy, gamesmanship, or
other factors that further divorce election results from true employee
264
preferences.
Second, we expect that employees would perceive the election
procedure under the Principles as more fair. Increased perceived
procedural fairness likely would lead to greater acceptance of the final
265
outcome and, hence, less industrial strife. As mentioned earlier, the
266
UAW has proposed following the Principles. Anecdotally, reports
indicate improved perceived fairness, but no empirical work has been
267
done to date that shows this to be true. Ideally, it would be useful to
observe how employees regard the process under the Principles as
compared to traditional campaigns pursuant to the NLRA (the current
status quo) and as compared to the process when employers sign
neutrality agreements. No such study has been done as yet, but such data
would be instrumental in evaluating the ultimate effectiveness of the
reform proposed herein.

Conclusion
The right to collectively organize in the workplace is an important
one, even when union density is at such dismal levels. Public reaction to
then-recently elected Governor Walker’s proposal in Wisconsin to
eviscerate collective-bargaining rights for some public-sector unions
shows that even if unions are unpopular, Americans seem to believe in
the right to vote for or against a union and collectively bargain with
268
This core belief in the principle of the right to
employers.
democratically elect one’s representatives—in public office or in the
workplace—is at the heart of the conceptualization of fairness espoused
herein. We propose aiming for revised procedures that most accord with
this American ideal, without regard to election results. The focus should
be on making the process as fair and just as possible, independently of
the goal of turning around dwindling union-density trends. The law
should not simply perform the function of a teeter-totter—pushing winrates up and then, at some time in the future when union density rises,
pushing rates back down. This position should not be confused for a
264. The rate of contracts reached in the data noted in Ferguson, supra note 77, is only about 38%
of the petitions filed. This rate would hopefully also go up significantly for petitions guided by the
Principles as a function of the instances in which unions won elections.
265. E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural Fairness
as a Decision Heuristic, 38 Admin. Sci. Q. 224, 224 (1993).
266. Silvi, supra note 248.
267. Bensinger, supra note 243.
268. See Lydia Saad, Scaling Back State Programs is Least of Three Fiscal Evils, Gallup (Feb. 22,
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146276/Scaling-Back-State-Programs-Least-Three-Fiscal-Evils.aspx
(finding 61% of Americans would oppose the kind of bill proposed in Wisconsin).
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desire to see union rates remain low or to decline further. To the
contrary, the Authors recognize that there are serious gains that ought
not to be overlooked that come from collective democratic participation
269
However, reforming a system by presuming what
by workers.
employees want because they should want it seems backwards and even
counterproductive if the end goal is increasing union density. Perhaps the
focus ought to be shifted away from counting union shops and win rates,
and towards revising the electoral process for collective representation in
the workplace—something that American citizens seem to regard as a
sacred component of our democracy.
This does not stop us from wondering what effect the Principles
incorporated into law as proposed would have on union density. As
noted above, we expect the percentage of elections held as a function of
petitions filed to go up, but there could also be a rise in the number of
petitions filed. The leverage of the public specter of dishonesty or failure
to abide by American principles of letting employees fairly vote up or
down on a union could incentivize labor to file more petitions. Increasing
the rate of petitions filed could inflate the denominator such that even if
win rates remained constant, the win-rate percentage could drop. The
question is whether improved procedural fairness will end up reflecting
what unionists have told us—that employees really do want to be
represented by unions but have been afraid to vote their true desires for
fear of retribution. Or, will employers voluntarily imposing on
themselves procedurally fair conditions signal the opposite of threats of
retribution—that the employer is willing to respond reasonably to
employee concerns—and lower the likelihood of unions winning more
elections? An alternative signal to be gleaned from an employer signing
on to the Principles is that it took the threat of unionization to make the
employer honest. Or it could signal that the employer and union are able
to agree on things contractually, so maybe employees could envision life
under a collective-bargaining agreement as an improvement. Such signals
would increase the likelihood of unions winning more elections. Clearly,
more empirical research on the UAW’s experience with the Principles is
warranted, if not urgently needed, in order to increase the chances that
this proposal is taken seriously—something that could be critical as a
means of reforming labor law without political loggerheads.
A more interesting question is whether the Principles are applicable
to other areas of employment and, ultimately, other areas of law. We
believe that in the employment context, the adoption of a Principles-like
standard could lead to a more efficient and humane work environment
beneficial to employers, employees, taxpayers, and an overburdened

269. See, e.g., Clegg, supra note 53, at 311; John R. Commons, Institutional Economics, 26 Am.
Econ. Rev. 237, 247 (1936).
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judicial system. Perhaps the only ones who would not benefit would be
labor and employment lawyers.
An examination of the nonunionized private sector reveals that the
law alone incentivizes management to behave in ways that are risk averse
because the floor of behavior the law creates makes exceeding the
minimum inadvisable. In fact, there are situations in which enlightened
human-resource procedures exceed the law’s protections, but they put
the employer at risk for legal action and are therefore discouraged or
avoided in spite of their clear benefits. For example, in sexualharassment law, employment policies that make it easier for employees
to report harassment (such as 1-800 reporting numbers) increase the
270
likelihood of employer exposure to liability. Some wage-and-hour laws
prohibit employees and employers from agreeing to things that might be
mutually beneficial without being exploitive, such as longer work days in
exchange for time off, tip pooling, and modifying exempt and nonexempt
271
statuses. There are situations in which both employees and employers
would like to create their own work rules but are prohibited by law from
272
doing so. We contend that employers who agree to the Principles
should be able to enter into contracts with the employees that benefit all
concerned. Thus, instead of enforcing laws drafted with the most
unethical employers in mind, why not let ethical employers establish
contracts with employees that are fair and benefit both?
In the 1930s, labor and management were enemies. Each side
thought it needed weapons to ensure peace. Today, the enemy is neither
labor nor management. Instead, increased global competition, diminishing
natural resources, environmental concerns, and sustaining a high
standard of living are what both labor and capital must battle. Perhaps
the Authors are overly optimistic, but one way to win this battle may be
to have the former enemies stop trying to manipulate the law, and
instead be guided by ethics, in order to compete with their real rivals.
The hope is that affording parties the opportunity to succeed in this way
will create an avenue to test whether we are overly optimistic. The costs
of finding out are low, and the rewards could be significant.

270. David Sherwyn, Michael Heise & Zev J. Eigen, Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the
Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1265, 1294 (2001) (arguing
that providing reporting mechanisms makes employees more likely to report harassment, making it
harder for employers to satisfy their duty of care).
271. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2010).
272. Id.

